Campanha Gallipoli - História

Campanha Gallipoli - História

Tropas otomanas


Os Aliados esperavam infligir um golpe rápido para nocautear os otomanos, capturando Constantinopla. Eles foram, entretanto, incapazes de romper o estreito de Dardanelos com sua força naval. Eles então tentaram capturar a costa com tropas terrestres, mas a campanha terminou indecisamente e eles foram forçados a se retirar.


Os otomanos eram os principais aliados dos alemães, e as forças aliadas atacaram as propriedades otomanas no Oriente Médio. No entanto, os otomanos controlavam o estreito de Dardanelos, o ponto de entrada no Mar Negro do Mediterrâneo e, portanto, uma importante porta de entrada para a Rússia. Os Aliados propuseram uma campanha ambiciosa para garantir a passagem pelos Dardanelos e, possivelmente, encerrar o envolvimento otomano na guerra. Os britânicos e franceses navegariam pelo estreito e capturariam Constantinopla (agora Istambul). A esperança dos aliados era que, com uma força naval avassaladora, eles pudessem romper as defesas dos Dardanelos e chegar a Constantinopla.

Os Aliados lançaram seu primeiro ataque em 19 de fevereiro de 1915, quando os navios de guerra britânicos começaram o bombardeio de longo alcance dos fortes otomanos ao longo da costa. Os bombardeios iniciais foram bem-sucedidos, apesar dos atrasos causados ​​pelo mau tempo e, em 25 de fevereiro, os Royal Marines aterrissaram para destruir os restos das baterias que guardavam a entrada do estreito. No entanto, muitos dos canhões otomanos eram móveis e tornou-se cada vez mais difícil destruí-los. Assim, foi decidido lançar um ataque total na parte mais estreita do estreito. Dezoito navios de guerra britânicos e franceses, juntamente com cruzadores e contratorpedeiros de apoio, lançaram seu ataque em 18 de março. Infelizmente, a tarefa de remover as minas foi deixada para barcos civis e eles não estavam preparados para trabalhar sob o fogo das baterias otomanas restantes e, portanto, as minas foram Não autorizado. O resultado foi o encouraçado francês Bouvet que atingiu uma mina e afundou. O HMS Irressistible e o HMS Inflexible foram danificados, assim como o HMS Ocean. Dois navios de guerra franceses adicionais também foram danificados. Alguns oficiais acreditaram que o navio deveria seguir em frente apesar das perdas, mas outros acreditaram que uma retirada era necessária e eles prevaleceram.

Com a aparente impossibilidade de romper apenas com as forças navais, foi decidido desembarcar as forças e proteger a costa norte. Em 25 de abril, os desembarques foram feitos por forças britânicas, austríacas e neozelandesas em seis praias. As forças aliadas enfrentaram uma resistência mais difícil do que o esperado dos otomanos e, embora pudessem lutar para o interior a partir da praia, os reforços otomanos chegaram antes que pudessem vencer uma batalha decisiva. As baixas foram altas. O otomano lançou uma grande contra-ofensiva em 19 de maio na esperança de desalojar as forças aliadas. Os otomanos esperavam levar as ideias do dia ao elemento da surpresa, no entanto, seus movimentos foram avistados por aviões britânicos e os aliados dizimaram seu avanço com os otomanos sofrendo 13.000 baixas. Os Aliados tentaram mais uma campanha ofensiva em agosto, mas não obteve nenhum progresso significativo.

No início de dezembro, foi decidido evacuar a área. As últimas forças aliadas deixaram a península na noite de 9 de janeiro de 1916. Ironicamente, em uma campanha em que nada parecia dar certo, uma das manobras militares mais difíceis e a retirada de uma cabeceira de praia foram implementadas com sucesso quase na perfeição.

A campanha foi um fracasso total e caro. Os britânicos perderam 43.000 homens mortos ou desaparecidos, enquanto os otomanos perderam 56.000.


Gallipoli Campaign

o Campanha de Gallipoli ocorreu entre abril e dezembro de 1915 em um esforço para tirar os Dardanelos do Império Turco Otomano (um aliado da Alemanha e da Áustria) e, assim, forçá-lo a sair da guerra. Cerca de 60.000 australianos e 18.000 neozelandeses faziam parte de uma força britânica maior. Cerca de 26.000 australianos e 7.571 neozelandeses ficaram feridos e 7.594 australianos e 2.431 NZs foram mortos. Em termos numéricos, Gallipoli foi uma campanha menor, mas assumiu considerável importância nacional e pessoal para os australianos e neozelandeses que ali lutaram.

A Campanha de Gallipoli foi a introdução da Austrália e da Nova Zelândia à Grande Guerra. Muitos australianos e neozelandeses lutaram na Península desde o dia do desembarque (25 de abril de 1915) até a evacuação de 20 de dezembro de 1915. O 25 de abril é o equivalente do Dia do Armistício na Nova Zelândia e é marcado como o dia ANZAC em ambos os países com Dawn Parades e outros serviços em todas as cidades e vilas. As lojas fecham pela manhã. É um dia muito importante para os australianos e neozelandeses por uma série de razões que mudaram e se transmutaram ao longo dos anos.


Conteúdo

Charles Bean nasceu em Bathurst, New South Wales, o primeiro de três filhos do reverendo Edwin Bean (1851-1922), então diretor do All Saints 'College, Bathurst, e Lucy Madeline Bean, nascida Butler, (1852-1942) . A preocupação dos pais de Bean com a verdade, a justiça social e o serviço público tornou-se sua. [26] [27]

Sua família e sua educação formal promoveram seus valores que foram influenciados pela "Tradição de Arnold", o modelo de valores morais e educação defendido pelo Dr. Arnold da Escola de Rugby na Inglaterra. Este modelo enfatizou a autoestima individual e as qualidades associadas ao 'bom caráter': confiança e confiabilidade, honestidade, abertura, autodisciplina, autossuficiência, pensamento e ação independentes, amizade e preocupação com o bem comum sobre interesses egoístas ou setoriais . [28] A preocupação ao longo da vida de Bean com o caráter era consistente com, se não um reflexo, da "Tradição de Arnold. [29] [30]

A educação formal de Bean começou na Austrália, no All Saints ’College, Bathurst. Em 1889, quando Bean tinha nove anos, a família mudou-se para a Inglaterra, onde foi educado na Brentwood School, Essex (1891-1894), da qual seu pai era o recém-nomeado diretor. Mais tarde, Bean ingressou no Clifton College, em Bristol - a alma mater de seu pai, cujo ethos também estava na tradição de Arnold. [31]

Enquanto estava em Clifton, Bean desenvolveu um interesse por literatura e em 1898 ganhou uma bolsa de estudos para o Hertford College, Oxford, obtendo um mestrado em artes em 1903 e um bacharelado em direito civil em 1904. [32]

Durante sua escolaridade, Bean serviu no corpo de voluntários no Clifton College e na Universidade de Oxford. [33]

Bean retornou à Austrália em 1904 e lecionou brevemente, incluindo uma passagem pela Sydney Grammar School, [34] e depois trabalhou como assistente jurídico em um circuito rural de 1905 a 1907. Ele renunciou ao cargo de advogado auxiliando o Sr. Justice Owen em maio de 1907 , [35] e relatou suas experiências em The Sydney Morning Herald em uma série de artigos. Em junho de 1908, ele ingressou The Sydney Morning Herald como repórter. Em meados de 1909, trabalhava em artigos encomendados. O primeiro era "The Wool Land", em três parcelas semanais. [36] [37] [38]

Foi durante esse período de viagem pelo outback de Nova Gales do Sul que Bean fez duas viagens no vaporizador Jandra, [39] que ele contou em Dreadnought of the Darling, serializado no Sydney Mail em 1910, depois publicado em livro em 1911.

Em 1911 e 1912, ele foi o Arauto correspondente em Londres. Mais uma vez, ele fez bom uso de suas oportunidades, produzindo uma série de artigos que elaborou para seu próximo livro Flagships Three, que recebeu críticas favoráveis. [40]

Após a declaração de guerra do Império Britânico contra o Império Alemão em 4 de agosto de 1914, Bean conseguiu uma nomeação como correspondente oficial de guerra da Força Imperial Australiana em setembro, tendo sido selecionado para o cargo pelo conselho executivo dos Jornalistas Australianos. Associação, vencendo Keith Murdoch por pouco. [41] [42] Ele foi comissionado como capitão da A.I.F. e relatou todas as principais campanhas em que as tropas australianas entraram em ação no conflito.

Egito Editar

Bean chegou ao Egito em 3 de dezembro de 1914. Ele foi convidado por Senior A.I.F. Comando para escrever um livreto, 'O que saber no Egito ... Um guia para soldados australianos' para ajudar as tropas a entender melhor seu novo ambiente '. [43] Apesar do conselho contido no guia, "um punhado de desordeiros" foi enviado para casa do Egito e Bean foi convidado a enviar um relatório cobrindo o assunto. A cobertura de jornal resultante despertou preocupação nas famílias na Austrália e ressentimento em relação a ele entre as tropas no Egito. [44]

Gallipoli Campaign Edit

Bean desembarcou na enseada de Anzac, na Península de Gallipoli, às 10 horas da manhã de 25 de abril de 1915, algumas horas antes do desembarque marítimo das primeiras tropas, e forneceu relatos à imprensa sobre as experiências dos australianos ali durante a maior parte da campanha.

Como correspondente de guerra, a cópia de Bean era detalhada e precisa, mas carecia do estilo narrativo empolgante dos correspondentes de guerra ingleses como Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, que produziu o primeiro relato de testemunha ocular do teatro da península, publicado em jornais australianos em 8 de maio de 1915 Como a demanda por reportagens sobre os eventos em Gallipoli aumentou no público doméstico australiano, jornais nacionais como A idade e O argus parou de carregar a cópia de Bean devido ao seu estilo desagradável. [ citação necessária ]

No início de maio, Bean viajou para o Cabo Helles com a 2ª Brigada de Infantaria para cobrir a Segunda Batalha de Krithia. Quando a brigada foi chamada para avançar no final da tarde de 8 de maio de 1915, Bean foi com eles de sua posição de reserva para a linha de partida para o ataque e viu-se sob fogo inimigo pela primeira vez (na forma de projéteis de estilhaços de artilharia) . Aqui ele foi recomendado para a Cruz Militar por bravura sob fogo no resgate de um soldado ferido, mas foi inelegível porque seu posto militar era apenas honorário. [45] Enquanto estava sob fogo nesta ação, Bean abandonou seu status de observador e se envolveu nos procedimentos, levando mensagens entre o comandante da brigada Brigadeiro General James M'Cay e elementos da formação, ele também atravessou o campo de batalha entregando água aos homens no condições áridas e ajudando a transportar os feridos, incluindo o Comandante do 6º Batalhão, AIF, Tenente Coronel Walter McNicoll. [ citação necessária ]

Na noite de 6 de agosto de 1915, Bean foi atingido na perna por uma bala turca enquanto seguia a coluna da 4ª Brigada de Infantaria do Brigadeiro-General John Monash na abertura da Batalha de Sari Bair. Apesar da ferida, ele se recusou a ser evacuado clinicamente, [46] e continuou com seu papel relatando a fase final de derrota da campanha de Gallipoli e o abandono e retirada da Península pelas Forças Imperiais Britânicas.

Bean deixou Gallipoli na noite de 17 de dezembro de 1915, duas noites antes da evacuação final da Enseada de Anzac pelo A.I.F. Retornou a ela após a guerra, em 1919, com a Australian Historical Mission. [47]

Edição da Frente Ocidental

Em 1916, Bean foi com a Força Imperial Australiana enquanto ela se mudava do teatro de operações do Mediterrâneo para a França após o fracasso da campanha de Gallipoli. [41] Ele relatou todos, exceto um dos combates envolvendo tropas australianas, observando em primeira mão a "névoa da guerra", os problemas em manter a comunicação entre os comandantes nas tropas da retaguarda e da linha de frente, e entre unidades isoladas da linha de frente tropas e os problemas tecnológicos que existiam no meio da guerra na coordenação das atividades das forças de infantaria com outras armas da Força, como a artilharia, e com forças separadas em cada flanco de unidades engajadas. Seu relato detalhava também como relatos feitos por tropas da linha de frente e soldados alemães capturados às vezes podem ser enganosos quanto ao curso real dos eventos, dada sua perspectiva limitada no campo de batalha, e também sobre os efeitos do bombardeio da artilharia devastadora incêndio.

Foi durante seu tempo com a A.I.F. na Frente Ocidental que Bean começou a pensar na preservação histórica das experiências australianas do conflito com o estabelecimento de um museu permanente e um memorial nacional de guerra, e a coleção de um registro dos eventos. (Simultaneamente aos pensamentos de Bean ao longo dessas linhas, em 16 de maio de 1917, a Seção de Registros de Guerra da Austrália foi criada sob o comando do Capitão John Treloar para gerenciar a coleção de documentos relacionados ao conflito e importantes artefatos físicos. o Australian Salvage Corps, encarregado de localizar itens considerados de interesse histórico a partir dos destroços que estavam processando nos campos de batalha para sucata ou reparo.)

Bean tinha um subsídio de 15 libras para roupas [48] do governo australiano, gastando-o no que se tornaria seu "traje distinto". Ele também estava equipado com um cavalo e uma selaria. O soldado Arthur Bazley foi designado batman de Bean e os dois se tornaram amigos.

A influência de Bean em meio ao esforço de guerra australiano cresceu à medida que a guerra avançava, e ele a usou para argumentar sem sucesso nos círculos do governo australiano contra a nomeação do general John Monash para o comando do Australian Corps em 1918. Ele expressou opiniões anti-semitas sobre Monash e seu favoritismo percebido na forma como ele dispensou promoções. [ citação necessária ] [49] (Monash era judeu) e Bean o descreveu como um "judeu agressivo". [50] Bean ganhou a ira de Monash em troca de não dar a seu comando a publicidade que Monash pensava que merecia durante a campanha de Gallipoli. Bean não confiou no que sentia ser a tendência de Monash para a autopromoção, escrevendo em seu diário: "Não queremos a Austrália representada por homens principalmente por causa da capacidade, natural e inata dos judeus, de se impulsionar". Bean favoreceu a nomeação do Chefe do Estado-Maior da Austrália, Brudenell White, o planejador meticuloso por trás da retirada de Gallipoli ou do General William Birdwood, o comandante inglês das forças australianas em Gallipoli. Apesar de sua oposição à nomeação de Monash, Bean mais tarde reconheceu seu sucesso no papel, observando que ele havia sido um comandante de corpo melhor do que um brigadeiro, admitindo que seu papel em tentar influenciar a decisão havia sido impróprio.

O irmão de Bean era anestesista e serviu como major do Corpo Médico da Frente Ocidental.

Em 1916, o Gabinete de Guerra Britânico concordou em conceder aos historiadores oficiais do Domínio acesso aos diários de guerra de todas as unidades do Exército Britânico que lutam em ambos os lados de uma unidade do Domínio, bem como todos os quartéis-generais que emitiram ordens para as unidades do Domínio, incluindo o GHQ do Força Expedicionária Britânica. Ao final da guerra, o Comitê de Defesa Imperial (CID) estava menos disposto a divulgar essa informação, possivelmente temendo que fosse usada para criticar a condução da guerra. Demorou seis anos de persistência antes que Bean tivesse acesso permitido e mais três anos para um balconista fazer cópias da enorme quantidade de documentos. Bean, portanto, tinha à sua disposição recursos que foram negados a todos os historiadores britânicos não vinculados à Seção Histórica do CID.

Bean não estava disposto a comprometer seus valores para ganho pessoal ou conveniência política. Ele não foi influenciado por sugestões e críticas do historiador oficial britânico, Sir James Edmonds, sobre a direção de seu trabalho. Edmonds relatou ao CID que, "O tom geral da narrativa de Bean é deplorável do ponto de vista imperial." Por sua postura independente, é provável que Bean tenha sido negada a condecoração do rei George V, apesar de ter sido recomendado em duas ocasiões durante a guerra pelo comandante do Australian Corps. Bean não foi motivado pela glória pessoal muitos anos depois, quando lhe foi oferecido o título de cavaleiro, ele recusou. [8]

Em 1919, Bean liderou a Missão Histórica Australiana de volta à península de Gallipoli para revisitar o campo de batalha de 1915. Pela primeira vez, ele foi capaz de caminhar sobre o terreno onde algumas das famosas batalhas foram travadas, como Lone Pine e em Nek, onde ele encontrou os ossos dos cavaleiros leves ainda deitados onde caíram na manhã de 7 de agosto de 1915. Ele também instruiu o Australian Flying Corps, uma das poucas unidades australianas envolvidas nas forças de ocupação na Alemanha, para coletar aeronaves alemãs para serem devolvidas para a Austrália, eles obtiveram um Pfalz D.XII e um Albatros D.Va.

Após seu retorno à Austrália em 1919, Bean começou a trabalhar com uma equipe de pesquisadores no História Oficial da Austrália na Guerra de 1914-1918 e o primeiro volume, cobrindo a formação da AIF e o desembarque na Enseada de Anzac, foi publicado em 1921. Seria 21 anos antes que o último dos 12 volumes (Volume VI) fosse publicado. Bean escreveu pessoalmente os primeiros 6 volumes cobrindo o envolvimento do Exército. Em 1946 ele publicou Anzac para Amiens, uma versão condensada da História Oficial - este era o único livro do qual ele possuía os direitos autorais e recebia royalties.

O estilo de história da guerra de Bean era diferente de tudo que existia antes. Refletindo parcialmente sua formação como jornalista, ele se concentrou tanto nas "pessoas pequenas" quanto nos grandes temas da Primeira Guerra Mundial. O tamanho menor do contingente do Exército australiano (240.000) permitiu-lhe descrever a ação em muitos casos até o nível dos indivíduos, o que se adequava ao tema de Bean de que a conquista do Exército australiano era a história desses indivíduos tanto quanto era de generais ou políticos. Bean também era fascinado pelo personagem australiano e usou a história para descrever, e de alguma forma criar, uma visão um tanto idealizada de um personagem australiano que olhava para trás em suas origens britânicas, mas também se libertou das limitações daquela sociedade. "Foi o caráter", escreveu ele, "que invadiu as colinas de Gallipoli e se manteve lá durante a longa tarde e noite, quando tudo parecia ter dado errado." [51]

A abordagem de Bean, apesar de seus preconceitos e de sua intenção de fazer da história uma declaração sobre a sociedade, foi meticulosamente registrar e analisar o que acontecera nos campos de batalha. Em geral, seu método consistia em descrever o teatro mais amplo da guerra e, em seguida, o planejamento detalhado por trás de cada batalha. Ele então passou para as perspectivas do comandante australiano e as contrastou com as impressões das tropas na linha de frente (geralmente reunidas por Bean 'no local'). Ele então foi além e citou extensivamente os registros alemães (ou turcos) do mesmo noivado e, finalmente, resumiu o que realmente aconteceu (muitas vezes usando técnicas forenses, examinando o terreno após a guerra). Durante todo ele observou as baixas individuais australianas onde havia qualquer evidência das circunstâncias de sua morte. Mesmo com aquele pequeno contingente de 240.000 (dos quais 60.000 morreram), esta foi uma tarefa monumental. Bean também - de maneira única - relatou em última análise seu próprio envolvimento nas manobras em torno das decisões de comando em relação a Gallipoli e a nomeação do Comandante do Corpo de exército australiano, e não se poupou de algumas críticas com a sabedoria de retrospectiva.

O estilo de escrita de Bean influenciou profundamente os subsequentes historiadores de guerra australianos, como Gavin Long (que foi nomeado por recomendação de Bean), e a série da Segunda Guerra Mundial, descrevendo as batalhas do Norte da África, Creta, Nova Guiné e Malásia, mantêm o compromisso de Bean de contar aos história de indivíduos, bem como a história maior.

Bean desempenhou um papel essencial na criação do Australian War Memorial. [52] Depois de experimentar a Primeira Guerra Mundial como o historiador oficial da guerra australiana, ele voltou para a Austrália determinado a estabelecer uma exibição pública de relíquias e fotografias do conflito. Bean dedicou grande parte de sua vida ao desenvolvimento do Australian War Memorial, localizado em Canberra e agora um dos principais ícones culturais da Austrália.

Foi durante o tempo que passou com a Primeira Força Imperial Australiana na Europa que Bean começou a pensar seriamente sobre a necessidade de um museu de guerra australiano. Um amigo próximo dele durante esse tempo, A.W. Bazley, lembrou que "em várias ocasiões ele falou sobre o que tinha em mente a respeito de algum futuro museu australiano memorial da guerra". Bean imaginou um memorial que não apenas acompanharia e manteria registros e relíquias da guerra, mas também homenagearia os australianos que perderam suas vidas lutando por seu país.

Em 1917, como resultado das sugestões de Bean ao Ministro da Defesa, Senador George Pearce, foi criada a Seção de Registros de Guerra da Austrália. O AWRS foi criado para garantir que a Austrália tivesse sua própria coleção de registros e relíquias da Primeira Guerra Mundial travada. Este departamento organizou a coleta de relíquias do campo e a nomeação de fotógrafos e artistas oficiais de guerra. Muitas das inúmeras relíquias coletadas e fotografias e pinturas produzidas podem ser vistas no Australian War Memorial hoje. A qualidade das pinturas da Primeira Guerra Mundial é atribuída em grande parte ao "controle de qualidade" exercido por Bean. [52]

A base do edifício conhecido hoje como Australian War Memorial foi concluído em 1941. O site do Memorial descreve o plano de construção como "um meio-termo entre o desejo de um monumento impressionante aos mortos e um orçamento de apenas £ 250.000". O sonho de Bean de um memorial em reconhecimento aos soldados australianos que lutaram na Grande Guerra havia finalmente se realizado. No entanto, quando se percebeu que a segunda guerra mundial tinha uma magnitude igual à da primeira, entendeu-se que o memorial deveria homenagear também os militares do último conflito, apesar das intenções originais.

O Hall of Memory, concluído em 1959, não poderia ter realizado o sonho de comemoração de Bean de forma mais completa. Ele aderiu à visão de Bean de que a guerra não deveria ser glorificada, mas que aqueles que morreram lutando por seu país deveriam ser lembrados. Os princípios morais de Bean como este, e o fato de que o inimigo não deve ser referido em termos depreciativos, junto com muitos outros, influenciaram muito o ângulo filosófico que o Australian War Memorial sempre assumiu e continuaria a assumir.

  • Com a nau capitânia do Sul (1909)
  • Na trilha de lã (1910)
  • The Dreadnought of the Darling (1911)
  • Flagships Three (1913)
  • O que saber no Egito: um guia para soldados australianos, (1915)
  • O livro Anzac, escrito e ilustrado pelos homens de Anzac (Ed., 1916)
  • Cartas da França (1917)
  • Em suas mãos, australianos (1918)
  • História Oficial da Austrália na Guerra de 1914-1918
  • Volume I - A História da Anzac: a primeira fase (1921)
  • Volume II - A História da Anzac: de 4 de maio de 1915 à evacuação (1924)
  • Volume III - A Força Imperial Australiana na França: 1916 (1929)
  • Volume IV - A Força Imperial Australiana na França: 1917 (1933)
  • Volume V - A Força Imperial Australiana na França: dezembro de 1917 a maio de 1918 (1937)
  • Volume VI - A Força Imperial Australiana na França: maio de 1918 - o Armistício (1942)
  • Objetivos de guerra de um australiano comum (1943)
  • Anzac para Amiens (1946)
  • Arquivos Federais da Austrália: Iniciativa de John Curtin (1947)
  • Aqui, meu filho, um relato das escolas independentes e de outras escolas corporativas para meninos da Austrália (1950)
  • Missão Gallipoli (1952)
  • Dois homens que eu conheci, William Bridges e Brudenell White, fundadores da A.I.F. (1957)
  • Uma bibliografia das principais obras de CEW Bean,APÊNDICE X, para 'SEJA SUBSTANCIALMENTE GRANDE EM SI MESMO: Conhecendo o C.E.W. Bean Barrister, Judge’s Associate, Moral Philosopher (2011) '[53]

Bean casou-se com Ethel Clara "Effie" Young de Tumbarumba em 24 de janeiro de 1921. Ela morreu na década de 1990. [ citação necessária ]

Em Poets Corner of Central Park em Bourke, Nova Gales do Sul, uma placa indica Bean's Na trilha da lã (1910) livro.


Gallipoli

A Batalha de Gallipoli foi um dos maiores desastres dos Aliados na Primeira Guerra Mundial. Foi realizado entre 25 de abril de 1915 e 9 de janeiro de 1916 na península de Gallipoli, no Império Otomano. A campanha condenada foi planejada por Winston Churchill para encerrar a guerra mais cedo, criando uma nova frente de guerra que os otomanos não poderiam enfrentar.

Em 25 de novembro de 1914, Winston Churchill sugeriu seu plano para uma nova frente de guerra nos Dardanelos ao Conselho de Guerra do governo britânico. Em 15 de janeiro de 1915, o Conselho de Guerra deu seu acordo e as tropas britânicas no Egito foram colocadas em alerta. As Potências Centrais estavam lutando principalmente em duas frentes - as Frentes Ocidental e Oriental. Lutar contra forças como os exércitos russo e francês colocou uma grande pressão sobre os militares alemães. A contribuição do exército austríaco menor nas principais batalhas foi pequena quando comparada à contribuição do exército alemão.

A ideia de Churchill era simples. A criação de outra frente forçaria os alemães a dividir ainda mais seu exército, pois precisariam apoiar o esgotamento do exército turco. Quando os alemães fossem ajudar os turcos, isso deixaria suas linhas enfraquecidas no oeste ou no leste e levaria a uma maior mobilidade lá, já que os Aliados teriam um exército enfraquecido para lutar contra.

Os turcos haviam se juntado aos Poderes Centrais em novembro de 1914 e eram vistos por Churchill como o ponto fraco daqueles que lutaram contra os Aliados.

Churchill havia contatado o almirante Carden, chefe da frota britânica ancorada ao largo dos Dardanelos, para saber suas idéias sobre um ataque naval às posições turcas nos Dardanelos. Carden foi cauteloso quanto a isso e respondeu a Churchill que um ataque gradual poderia ser mais apropriado e ter uma chance maior de sucesso. Churchill, como primeiro lorde do almirantado, pressionou Carden a apresentar um plano que ele, Churchill, pudesse submeter ao Ministério da Guerra. Os comandantes mais graduados da Marinha estavam preocupados com a velocidade com que Churchill parecia estar promovendo um ataque aos Dardanelos. Eles acreditavam que o planejamento de longo prazo era necessário e que o desejo de Churchill por um plano rápido e, portanto, a execução era arriscada. No entanto, tal era o entusiasmo de Churchill que o Conselho de Guerra aprovou seu plano e definiu fevereiro como o mês em que a campanha deveria começar.

Há confusão quanto ao que foi decidido nesta reunião do Conselho de Guerra. Churchill acreditava ter recebido autorização. Asquith acreditava que o que foi decidido era meramente "provisório para preparar, mas nada mais". Um membro naval do Conselho, o almirante Sir Arthur Wilson, declarou:

“Não era da minha conta. Eu não estava de forma alguma conectado com a questão, e ela nunca foi colocada oficialmente diante de mim de forma alguma. ”

O secretário de Churchill considerou que os membros da Marinha que estavam presentes "apenas concordaram com uma operação puramente naval no entendimento de que sempre poderíamos recuar - que não deveria haver dúvida sobre o que é conhecido como forçar os Dardanelos".

Com tanta apreensão e aparente confusão quanto ao que o Ministério da Guerra acreditava, o plano de Churchill foi levado adiante. Parecia que havia uma crença de que os turcos seriam um alvo fácil e que uma força mínima seria necessária para o sucesso. Carden recebeu autorização para preparar um ataque.

Ironicamente, em 1911, Churchill havia escrito:

“É preciso lembrar que não é mais possível forçar os Dardanelos e ninguém exporia uma frota moderna a tanto perigo.”

No entanto, ele havia ficado muito impressionado com o poder e a capacidade destrutiva da artilharia alemã no ataque aos fortes da Bélgica em 1914. Churchill acreditava que os fortes turcos nos Dardanelos estavam ainda mais expostos e abertos aos tiros navais britânicos.

Em 19 de fevereiro de 1915, Carden abriu o ataque às posições turcas nos Dardanelos. Tropas britânicas e ANZAC foram colocadas de prontidão no Egito.

O encouraçado "Cornwallis" bombardeando a península de Gallipoli

Os ataques iniciais de Carden foram bem. Os fortes externos em Sedd-el-Bahr e Kumkale caíram. No entanto, uma oposição mais severa foi encontrada no Estreito. Aqui, os turcos haviam minado pesadamente a água e os arrastões de varredura de minas mostraram-se ineficazes para removê-los. Os navios sob o comando de Carden eram antigos (com exceção do "Queen Elizabeth") e a resistência dos turcos era maior do que o previsto. O ataque foi interrompido. Carden entrou em colapso devido a problemas de saúde e foi substituído pelo contra-almirante Robeck.

Até agora, houve uma entrada militar no plano da Grã-Bretanha. O tenente-general Birdwood, que havia sido um ex-secretário militar de Lord Kitchener, comandou o ANZAC com base no Egito. Ele relatou que um apoio militar para a marinha era imperativo e o General Sir Ian Hamilton foi nomeado comandante da recém-criada Força Expedicionária do Mediterrâneo. Continha 70.000 homens da Grã-Bretanha, Austrália e Nova Zelândia, juntamente com tropas da França. Hamilton partiu para Dardanelos em 13 de fevereiro junto com uma equipe reunida às pressas. Ele tinha poucas informações sobre a força turca e chegou em 18 de março sabendo pouco sobre a situação militar lá. É provável que ele tivesse a mesma opinião sobre a habilidade dos turcos em batalha - e isso custaria muito caro para a força sob seu comando.

Também em 18 de março, os Aliados sofreram um desastre naval cronicamente embaraçoso. Três navios de guerra britânicos foram afundados, três foram danificados (mas não afundados). De uma só vez, os britânicos perderam 2/3 de seus navios de guerra nos Dardanelos. Robeck tinha pouca ideia do que fazer a seguir. Os arrastões de remoção de minas foram ineficazes, os turcos ocuparam o terreno mais elevado, que era de grande importância estratégica, e a idéia de usar destróieres para limpar os campos minados teria demorado para ser organizada. O exército sugeriu que deveria assumir.

Em 22 de março, Hamilton e Robeck decidiram que a frota naval zarparia para Alexandria para dar tempo de se reorganizar enquanto Hamilton preparava sua força para uma batalha terrestre. De acordo com Winston Churchill, esta decisão foi tomada sem o conhecimento do governo:

“Nenhuma decisão formal de fazer um ataque terrestre foi sequer registrada nos registros do Gabinete ou do Conselho de Guerra. Este mergulho silencioso nesta vasta aventura militar deve ser considerado extraordinário. ” (Churchill)

Enquanto isso acontecia, o Conselho de Guerra não se reuniu e só se reuniria por mais dois meses!

A entrada do exército na campanha de Gallipoli foi um desastre. Parece que os comandantes mais graduados no terreno acreditavam que sua oposição simplesmente não correspondia aos padrões das tropas britânicas e do ANZAC.

O secretário do Conselho de Guerra, Sir Maurice Hankey, chamou todo o caso de uma "aposta", com base na crença de que os turcos seriam uma força inferior. Até mesmo o oficial geral comandando o Egito, Sir John Maxwell, escreveu "Quem está coordenando e dirigindo esta grande combinação?" O comentário de Maxwell foi adequado. Hamilton comandou o exército no terreno Robeck a marinha enquanto Maxwell era GOC Egito, onde as tropas estavam baseadas. Ninguém recebeu a responsabilidade geral.

Hamilton decidiu pousar em Gallipoli. O local de pouso mal era um segredo, já que a segurança na sede de Hamilton era considerada fraca, na melhor das hipóteses. O plano de Hamilton era que:

  • A 29ª Divisão pousaria em cinco pequenas praias no extremo sul da península
  • O ANZAC pousaria mais ao norte, apenas por um promontório saliente chamado Gaba Tepe.
  • Os franceses lançariam uma finta - uma "aterrissagem" na Baía de Besika. The French were to make a proper landing at Kum Kale to protect the 29th Division

It is generally assumed that one major failing of the Allied forces in the Dardanelles was that they underestimated the ability of the Turks. In fact, the Turkish Army was weak in the region and it was poorly led. On March 24th, the command of the Turks was passed to General Liman von Sanders. He had to defend a coastline of 150 miles with just 84,000 men. However, its fighting capacity was just 62,000 men. The troops that were there were poorly equipped and supplies were poor. Sanders could not call on one plane to assist him. However, he placed his men away from the beaches much to the consternation of the Turkish officers there. They argued that there were so few beaches that the Allies could land on, that Turkish troops were better being placed on the beaches or immediately above them.

The landings started on April 25th. The British landed unopposed on three beaches at Cape Helles. Another landing was resisted but the Turks were defeated. But the landing at Sedd-el-Bahr was a disaster. The British were caught in the fire of well dug-in Turkish machine gunners. Many British troops could not get ashore and were killed at sea.

The ANZAC’s landed at Anzac Cove. Here they were faced with steep cliffs which they had to climb to get off the beach. To make matter worse, Anzac Cove was a tiny beach and quickly became very congested. The Turks pushed back the initial ANZAC move inland. The fighting was bloody and costly. The Turks in this area were led by the unknown Colonel Mustapha Kemel. Lieutenant-General Birdwood asked Hamilton for permission to withdraw his troops. Hamilton refused.

Some months later Birdwood wrote:

“He (Hamilton) should have taken much more personal charge and insisted on things being done and really take command, which he has never yet done.”

By May in Helles, the British had lost 20,000 men out of 70,000. Six thousand had been killed. The medical facilities were completely overwhelmed by the casualties. Trench warfare occurred along with the fear of dysentery and the impact of the heat. One British soldier wrote that Helles:

“looked like a midden and smelt like an open cemetery.”

The next phase of the battle started in August. Hamilton ordered an attack on Suvla Bay that was not heavily defended. The landing took place on August 6th and involved the landing of 63,000 Allied troops. This time the secrecy behind the operation was so complete that senior officers were unaware of what others were doing. These 63,000 men were meant to take the area around Suvla Bay and then link up with the ANZAC’s at Anzac Cove. The plan very nearly worked but the ANZAC’s could not break out of Anzac Cove. The British at Suvla were pushed back by a frantic attack led by Mustapha Kemal and by August 10th, the Turks had retaken Suvla Bay.

However, the opponents of the campaign in London had become louder and more numerous. Hamilton was recalled and he was replaced by Sir Charles Monro. He recommended evacuation and the task was given to Birdwood. The evacuation of Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove was a brilliant success. It was accomplished on December 19th to December 20th. Not one casualty occurred.

The evacuation of Helles occurred on January 8th to January 9th, again with no loss of life. Thus the campaign ended with two successes.

However, the overall campaign was a disaster of the first order. Over 200,000 Allied casualties occurred with many deaths coming from disease. The number of Turkish deaths is not clear but it is generally accepted that they were over 200,000.

Before the Gallipoli campaign even got started, Lloyd George had prophetically written:

“Expeditions which are decided upon and organised with insufficient care generally end disastrously.”

After the end of the campaign, opinions were divided. Sir Edward Grey and Lord Slim (who fought at Gallipoli) were scathing in their criticism. Slim called those who had been in command at the campaign the worst in the British Army since The Crimean War. Despite the losses, Churchill remained a defender of what had gone on – as was Hamilton.


Gallipoli: 5 reasons why the First World War campaign was a failure

But for the achievement of the Australian and New Zealander Army Corps (Anzac) in carving out a small bridgehead at Anzac Cove, the WW1 campaign to seize the Gallipoli peninsula was a disaster, says Peter Hart. Writing for BBC History Magazine, the author of a 2011 book on the disastrous First World War campaign offers his explanations for the Allies' failure in 1915

This competition is now closed

Published: April 9, 2021 at 11:11 am

What happened at Gallipoli?

The Gallipoli campaign was a terrible tragedy. The attempt by the Allies to seize the Gallipoli peninsula from the Ottoman empire and gain control over the strategically-important Dardanelles failed in a welter of hubris, blood and suffering. Located just across the Dardanelles straits from the fabled city of Troy, its classical undertones have helped create a rich mythology of ‘the terrible ifs’ of what might have been achieved with ‘a bit more luck’. The beach landings at Helles – the first made against modern weapons systems – saw incredible heroism and turned the sea at V Beach red with blood.

Gallipoli is today synonymous with the achievement of the Australian and New Zealander Army Corps (ANZAC) in carving out a small bridgehead at Anzac Cove. That maze of tangled gullies and ridges is still sacred for Australians.

But for all that the campaign was an utter failure. The question is why? Here are five possible reasons…

The Gallipoli campaign was poorly conceived

The First World War stalled when the huge armies of Germany and France fought themselves to a standstill on the Western Front in 1914. When the Ottoman Turks attacked Russians in the Caucasus mountains in December 1914, Russia went to her allies requesting help. The British were fully committed elsewhere but a group of politicians led by Winston Churchill, then at the Admiralty, sought to help Russia with an attack on the Gallipoli peninsula that aimed to gain control of the Dardanelles straits that separated Asia and Europe. This, it was boasted, would remove one of the allies ‘propping up’ Germany, influence wavering Balkan states and open the sea route to Russian Black Sea ports for the export of munitions to feed Russian guns on the Eastern Front.

Much of this was nonsense. There was no backdoor to Germany no easy route to victory, no allies that propped her up. Germany operated on interior lines of communications and even in the event of a Turkish defeat would merely have rushed reinforcements to bolster her Austro–Hungarian allies.

Finally Britain did not have sufficient munitions for her own armies. Britain had to fight the war as it was not how visionaries dreamt it might be. German armies were deep in France, and Britain could not just abandon her ally to her fate. The priority of the Western Front meant that the Gallipoli expedition could never be given sufficient men and guns to have any chance of success. As such it should never have been started.

The myths of the battle of Gallipoli

Professor Gary Sheffield challenges some commonly held assumptions about this failed attempt to change the course of the First World War…

The British Army wasn’t ready

The British Army of 1915 was not yet ready for war. There were not enough guns or shells for the Gallipoli campaign to have any chance against Turkish troops once they were well dug in, with barbed wire, machine guns and artillery. Success demanded hundreds of guns that did not exist, fired by gunners not yet trained, using complex artillery techniques that had not been invented, firing hundreds of thousands of shells as yet not manufactured. It required infantry tactics not yet painfully developed in the heat of battle and support weapons not yet imagined.

Gallipoli shared the failings of every campaign launched in that benighted year: a lack of realistic goals, no coherent plan, the use of inexperienced troops for whom this would be the first campaign, a failure to comprehend or properly disseminate maps and intelligence, negligible artillery support, totally inadequate logistical and medical arrangements, a gross underestimation of the enemy, incompetent local commanders – all of which was overlaid with lashings of misplaced over-confidence leading to inexorable disaster.

Gallipoli was damned before it started. Every day merely prolonged the agony and it ended in such catastrophe that it could only be disguised by vainglorious bluster.

Inferior leadership

The British commander was General Sir Ian Hamilton who was one of Britain’s greatest soldiers. He was no fool, but his plans for Gallipoli were fatally overcomplicated. He launched multiple attacks, each dependent on each other’s success, but left isolated when things went wrong. Taken as a whole, his schemes were utterly unrealistic. Everything had to go right, but his plans demanded incredible feats of heroism, raw troops would have to perform like veterans and incompetent subordinates lead like Napoleon. Above all, his plans demanded that the Turks put up little resistance. When the landings failed he blamed everyone but himself.

“Behind us we had a swarm of adverse influences: our own General Headquarters in France, the chief of the imperial general staff of the War Office, the first sea lord of the Admiralty, the French cabinet and the best organised part of the British press. Fate willed it so. Faint hearts and feeble wills seemed for a while to succeed in making vain the sacrifices of Anzac, Helles and Suvla. Only the dead men stuck it out to the last.” – General Sir Ian Hamilton

Opposing Hamilton was a German, General Otto Liman von Sanders. A steady professional, Liman husbanded his reserves until he knew what the British were doing before committing them to devastating effect. He was fortunate indeed in one of his Turkish subordinates Colonel Mustafa Kemal. As Kemal led his 57th Regiment into action against the Anzacs on 25 April his chilling words have gone down in legend: “I don’t order you to attack – I order you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can take our places.”

This unflinching martial spirit inspired the Turkish troops to victory.

The Turks were experienced and well led

Colonel Mustafa Kemal, who became President Kemal Atatürk after the war, summed up the grit and determination his countrymen demonstrated at Gallipoli. A good proportion of the Turkish soldiers had recent experience fighting in the Balkan wars of 1912–13. But all of them came from a country where life was hard. They made tough, well-disciplined soldiers when fighting in defence of their homeland.

“But think about the enemy which landed at Ari Burnu shores equipped with the most advanced war machinery, [they] were, by and large, forced to remain on these shores. Our officers and soldiers who with love for their motherland and religion and heroism protected the doors of their capital Constantinople against such a strong enemy, won the right to a status which we can be proud of. I congratulate all the members of the fighting units under my command. I remember with deep and eternal respect, all the ones who sacrificed their lives…” – Colonel Mustafa Kemal

In contrast, with the exception of the British 29th Division and two French divisions, most of the Allied troops committed to battle were inadequately trained. It was not that the Anzacs, the reservists of the Royal Naval Division, the Territorials and the first of Kitchener’s New Armies raised in 1914 were not keen it was just that they were not yet ready for war in such an unforgiving environment as Gallipoli. The Turks were experienced and well led. They were determined to win – and they did.

It was a logistical nightmare

The United Kingdom was some 2,000 miles away and the nearest ‘real’ base was that of Alexandria back in Egypt with its spacious quays, cranes, lighters, tugboats and plentiful labour. Yet it was nearly 700 miles from Alexandria to Gallipoli. The advanced base of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, some 60 miles from Helles, had a good natural anchorage. But that was all it offered – there were no port facilities. A phenomenal amount of work was required to build it up into a military supply base.

There was an advanced supply depot at Imbros, but even then there were still 15 miles of open sea to the Gallipoli peninsula where all the thousands of tonnes of necessary foodstuffs and munitions had to be landed on open beaches. Makeshift piers were all they had and these were ephemeral in the face of the raw power of the sea. Every day of the campaign Turkish shells crashed down on the beaches while soon U-boats lurked offshore.

Gallipoli was a logistical nightmare that would make any responsible staff officer tear his hair out. As a method of waging warfare, it was insanity.

Peter Hart is a military historian specialising in the First World War. He is the author of Gallipoli (Profile, 2011)


Goals of the Gallipoli Campaign

  • To get control over the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits
  • With control over this 67 kilometer stretch of water, it would be much easier to invade Constantinople and, eventually, Turkey
  • To open a supply route via the Black Sea to Russia, a British ally.
  • Eventually attacking Germany’s main other ally, Austria-Hungary
  • Shortening the war by taking down Germany’s allies

This article is part of our extensive collection of articles on the Great War. Click here to see our comprehensive article on World War 1.


Conteúdo

Antiquity and Middle Ages Edit

In ancient times, the Gallipoli Peninsula was known as the Thracian Chersonesus (from Greek χερσόνησος, "peninsula" [2] ) to the Greeks and later the Romans. It was the location of several prominent towns, including Cardia, Pactya, Callipolis (Gallipoli), Alopeconnesus (Greek: Ἀλωπεκόννησος ), [8] Sestos, Madytos, and Elaeus. The peninsula was renowned for its wheat. It also benefited from its strategic importance on the main route between Europe and Asia, as well as from its control of the shipping route from Crimea. The city of Sestos was the main crossing-point on the Hellespont.

According to Herodotus, the Thracian tribe of Dolonci (Greek: Δόλογκοι ) (or "barbarians" according to Cornelius Nepos) held possession of Chersonesus before the Greek colonization. Then, settlers from Ancient Greece, mainly of Ionian and Aeolian stock, founded about 12 cities on the peninsula in the 7th century BC. [9] The Athenian statesman Miltiades the Elder founded a major Athenian colony there around 560 BC. He took authority over the entire peninsula, augmenting its defences against incursions from the mainland. It eventually passed to his nephew, the more famous Miltiades the Younger, about 524 BC. The peninsula was abandoned to the Persians in 493 BC after the beginning of the Greco-Persian Wars (499–478 BC).

The Persians were eventually expelled, after which the peninsula was for a time ruled by Athens, which enrolled it into the Delian League in 478 BC. The Athenians established a number of cleruchies on the Thracian Chersonese and sent an additional 1,000 settlers around 448 BC. Sparta gained control after the decisive battle of Aegospotami in 404 BC, but the peninsula subsequently reverted to the Athenians. During the 4th century BC, the Thracian Chersonese became the focus of a bitter territorial dispute between Athens and Macedon, whose king Philip II sought possession. It was eventually ceded to Philip in 338 BC.

After the death of Philip's son Alexander the Great in 323 BC, the Thracian Chersonese became the object of contention among Alexander's successors. Lysimachus established his capital Lysimachia here. In 278 BC, Celtic tribes from Galatia in Asia Minor settled in the area. In 196 BC, the Seleucid king Antiochus III seized the peninsula. This alarmed the Greeks and prompted them to seek the aid of the Romans, who conquered the Thracian Chersonese, which they gave to their ally Eumenes II of Pergamon in 188 BC. At the extinction of the Attalid dynasty in 133 BC it passed again to the Romans, who from 129 BC administered it in the Roman province of Asia. It was subsequently made a state-owned territory (ager publicus) and during the reign of the emperor Augustus it was imperial property.

The Thracian Chersonese was part of the Eastern Roman Empire from its foundation in 330 AD. In 443 AD, Attila the Hun invaded the Gallipoli Peninsula during one of the last stages of his grand campaign that year. He captured both Callipolis and Sestus. [10] Aside from a brief period from 1204 to 1235, when it was controlled by the Republic of Venice, the Byzantine Empire ruled the territory until 1356. During the night between 1 and 2 March 1354, a strong earthquake destroyed the city of Gallipoli and its city walls, weakening its defenses.

Ottoman era Edit

Ottoman conquest Edit

Within a month after the devastating 1354 earthquake the Ottomans besieged and captured the town of Gallipoli, making it the first Ottoman stronghold in Europe and the staging area for Ottoman expansion across the Balkans. [11] The Savoyard Crusade recaptured Gallipoli for Byzantium in 1366, but the beleaguered Byzantines were forced to hand it back in September 1376. The Greeks living there were allowed to continue their everyday activities. In the 19th century, Gallipoli (Turkish: Gelibolu) was a district (kaymakamlik) in the Vilayet of Adrianople, with about thirty thousand inhabitants: comprising Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Jews. [12]

Crimean War (1853–1856) Edit

Gallipoli became a major encampment for British and French forces in 1854 during the Crimean War, and the harbour was also a stopping-off point between the western Mediterranean and Istanbul (formerly Constantinople). [13] [14]

In March 1854 British and French engineers constructed an 11.5 km (7.1 mi) line of defence to protect the peninsula from a possible Russian attack and so secure control of the route to the Mediterranean Sea. [15] : 414

First Balkan War, persecution of Greeks (1912–1913) Edit

Gallipoli did not experience any more wars until the First Balkan War, when the 1913 Battle of Bulair and several minor skirmishes took place there. A dispatch on 7 July 1913 reported that Ottoman troops treated Gallipoli's Greeks "with marked depravity" as they "destroyed, looted, and burned all the Greek villages near Gallipoli". [ citação necessária ] Ottoman forces sacked and completely destroyed many villages and killed some Greeks. The cause of this savagery in the part of the Turks was their fear that if Thrace was declared autonomous the Greek population might be found numerically superior to the Muslims. [ citação necessária ]

The Turkish Government, under the pretext that a village was within the firing line, ordered its evacuation within three hours. The residents abandoned everything they possessed, left their village and went to Gallipoli. Seven of the Greek villagers who stayed two minutes later than the three-hour limit allowed for the evacuation were shot by the soldiers. After the end of the Balkan War the exiles were allowed to return. But as the Government allowed only the Turks to rebuild their houses and furnish them, the exiled Greeks were compelled to remain in Gallipoli. [16]

World War I: Gallipoli Campaign, persecution of Greeks (1914–1919) Edit

During World War I (1914-1918), French, British and allied forces (Australian, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Irish and Indian) fought the Gallipoli campaign (1915-1916) in and near the peninsula, seeking to secure a sea route to relieve their eastern ally, Russia. The Ottomans set up defensive fortifications along the peninsula and contained the invading forces.

In early 1915, attempting to seize a strategic advantage in World War I by capturing Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), the British authorised an attack on the peninsula by French, British and British Empire forces. The first Australian troops landed at ANZAC Cove early in the morning of 25 April 1915. After eight months of heavy fighting the last Allied soldiers withdrew by 9 January 1916.

The campaign, one of the greatest Ottoman victories during the war, is considered by historians as a major Allied failure. Turks regard it as a defining moment in their nation's history: a final surge in the defence of the motherland as the Ottoman Empire crumbled. The struggle formed the basis for the Turkish War of Independence [ citação necessária ] and the founding of the Republic of Turkey [ citação necessária ] eight years later under President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who first rose to prominence as a commander at Gallipoli.

The Ottoman Empire instituted the Gallipoli Star as a military decoration in 1915 and awarded it throughout the rest of World War I.

The campaign was the first major military action of Australia and New Zealand (or Anzacs) as independent dominions. The date of the landing, 25 April, is known as "Anzac Day". It remains the most significant commemoration of military casualties and "returned soldiers" in Australia and New Zealand.

On the Allied side one of the promoters of the expedition was Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, whose bullish optimism hurt his reputation that took years to recover.

Whilst the underlying strategic concept of the campaign were sound the military forces of the WW1 lacked the logistical, technological and tactical capabilities to undertake an operation of this scope against a determined, well equipped defender.

The all arms coordination and logistical capabilities required to successfully prosecute such a campaign would only be achieved several decades later, during the successful Allied amphibious invasions of Europe and the Pacific during WW2.

Prior to the Allied landings in April 1915, [17] the Ottoman Empire deported Greek residents from Gallipoli and surrounding region and from the islands in the sea of Marmara, to the interior where they were at the mercy of hostile Turks. [18] The Greeks had little time to pack and the Ottoman authorities permitted them to take only some bedding and the rest was handed over to the Government. [18] The Turks also plundered Greek houses and properties. [19] A testimony of a deportee described how the deportees were forced onto crowded steamers, standing-room only how, on disembarking, men of military age were removed (for forced labour in the labour battalions of the Ottoman army) and how the rest were "scattered… among the farms like ownerless cattle". [ citação necessária ]

The Metropolitan of Gallipoli wrote on 17 July 1915 that the extermination of the Christian refugees was methodical. [16] He also mentions that "The Turks, like beasts of prey, immediately plundered all the Christians' property and carried it off. The inhabitants and refugees of my district are entirely without shelter, awaiting to be sent no one knows where . ". [16] Many Greeks died from hunger and there were frequent cases of rape among women and young girls, as well as their forced conversion to Islam. [16] In some cases, Muhacirs appeared in the villages even before the Greek inhabitants deported and stoned the houses and threatened the inhabitants that they would kill them if they didn't leave. [20]

Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) Edit

Greek troops occupied Gallipoli on 4 August 1920 during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–22, considered part of the Turkish War of Independence. After the Armistice of Mudros of 30 October 1918 it became a Greek prefecture centre as "Kallipolis". However, Greece was forced to withdraw from Eastern Thrace after the Armistice of Mudanya of October 1922. Gallipoli was briefly handed over to British troops on 20 October 1922, but finally returned to Turkish rule on 26 November 1922.

In 1920, after the defeat of the Russian White army of General Pyotr Wrangel, a significant number of émigré soldiers and their families evacuated to Gallipoli from the Crimean Peninsula. From there, many went to European countries, such as Yugoslavia, where they found refuge.

There are now many cemeteries and war memorials on the Gallipoli peninsula.

Turkish Republic Edit

Between 1923 and 1926 Gallipoli became the centre of Gelibolu Province, comprising the districts of Gelibolu, Eceabat, Keşan and Şarköy. After the dissolution of the province, it became a district centre in Çanakkale Province.


The Landings

View of Anzac Cove shortly after the landing.

On April 25, 1915, the army campaign began. Most of the troops came from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand the latter two gathered together in the ANZAC Division.

The preparations had been rushed. The operation – a beach landing in the face of heavily entrenched opponents – was unprecedented in modern warfare. The terrain was hostile, with steep cliffs and deep gullies along the coastline. Everything was set for disaster.

British forces were to land at Cape Helles, while the ANZACs were to land further north.

2000 British troops used a primitive landing craft made by converting the collier the River Clyde. The rest of the troops used rowing boats to get ashore. On some beaches, the British faced stiff resistance and were cut down in droves. Elsewhere they met almost no opposition but had no idea what to do next.

Meanwhile, the ANZACs became lost in the pre-dawn darkness and landed on the wrong stretch of coast. Instead of a gradual slope onto the peninsula, they faced steep gullies and tangled scrub. A swift response by the Turkish Mustafa Kemal saw their advance halted.

By the end of the day, the Allied forces were confined to narrow beachheads.


Churchill Archive for Schools

Detailed map of the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 showing British and Allied landing beaches. (The War Illustrated Album deLuxe published in London 1916 / Photo by Universal History Archive/Getty Images)

When the First World War broke out in July 1914 the general feeling was that it would be over by the end of that year. However, as 1914 turned into 1915 it was clear this wasn’t the case. On the Western Front in particular, the fighting had ground to a stalemate, and the casualties continued to rise. The politicians and the military commanders in Britain began to look for other ways to attack Germany and to alleviate the pressure on the Eastern Front. The Russian government had also formally requested a ‘show of strength’ against Turkey, one of Germany’s allies. As First Lord of the Admiralty, the government minister responsible for the British navy, Winston Churchill supported the idea of an attack on Turkey. The plan was to attack Gallipoli, a peninsula in the strategically important area of the Dardanelles near the Turkish capital of Constantinople (now Istanbul) and then move inland to capture the capital. It was hoped that once Turkey had been knocked out of the war, the Allies would have access to Russia’s Black Sea ports, creating a line of communication to Russia and access to Russian wheat necessary for the war effort. The campaign is either referred to as the Gallipoli Campaign or the Dardanelles Campaign.

The Gallipoli campaign began with the Allied bombardment of Turkish defences on 19 January 1915, followed a few months later by the landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula early on 25 April. The campaign lasted until January 1916 and was a costly failure for the Allies, with heavy losses (44, 000 dead) and no gains made. Even so, there’s been a lot of debate about porque it failed and how important that failure was in the context of the war overall.

The campaign has proved to be historically significant in other ways. A large number of the troops in the Allied force were from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, better known as ANZACs. Gallipoli was the first really high-profile campaign in which they took a leading role. More than 8,700 Australians and 2,779 New Zealanders (over half of all ANZAC troops sent) were killed. Gallipoli has proved to be a key event in Australian and New Zealand history, giving birth to an ANZAC legend which is still enormously important in those countries today.

While the public in Australia and New Zealand were proud of the bravery of their soldiers, there was also anger and dismay at the scale of the losses and an intense desire to find out what went wrong. For many years, the most widely accepted explanation was that the British officers in command at Gallipoli were incompetent, careless and regarded the troops as expendable. Was this impression of the British commanders and their planning fair? If not, why did the campaign go so badly wrong?

The documents in this investigation focus on the planning, communication and coordination in the run-up to the Gallipoli campaign. They tell us about how the commanders prepared and planned. However, if we look closely at the documents they also reveal other factors such as the difficult terrain faced by the Allies and the determination and strong resistance from the Turkish troops - and the Allies’ underestimation of their resilience. It’s important to recognise that we’re only looking at one, albeit crucial, aspect of the campaign in this investigation but you’ll find that the sources do contain references to these other factors, too.

Cape Helles, Gallipoli, 7 January 1916, just prior to the final evacuation of British forces during the Battle of Gallipoli. (© Lt. Ernest Brooks, Wikimedia Commons [Public Domain])


The Gallipoli campaign: a defining moment in Australian history

On 25 April 2015, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) landed at Gallipoli in Turkey during the First World War. Here, Australian writer Peter FitzSimons talks to Rob Attar about the experiences of his compatriots in the ensuing battle and explains why it has become such a defining moment in the country's history, commemorated each year on Anzac Day.

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Published: April 25, 2019 at 5:15 am

Q: Why does the battle of Gallipoli seem to have so much more importance for Australians than for people in Britain?

A: In 1901 all the colonies of Australia came together to become a country but there was a view at the time that you weren’t a serious nation until you had shed blood – both your own and that of your enemies.

Our great revered poet, Banjo Paterson, wrote a poem when the news came through of the Gallipoli landings: “…We’re not State children any more/We’re all Australians now…!/The mettle that a race can show/Is proved with shot and steel,/And now we know what nations know/And feel what nations feel…” There in that poem you have got the exultation that took place in Australia our diggers (slang for Antipodean soldiers) had fought for the British empire and they had done well. There is a pretty strong argument – which I have come to believe in – that while Australians went to that war as loyal sons of Great Britain, they came back as Australians.

Q: Why do you think that so many Australians volunteered to fight in the war in Europe?

A: The romantic reason was to fight for Britain – and that was certainly true of many of them. Andrew Fisher, who became Australian prime minister (for a third time) soon after the war began, proclaimed to great acclaim: We will fight for Great Britain to the “last man and the last shilling”. There were lots of patriots who left accounts saying that the mother country had called on her lion cubs to come to her aid and that’s what they were doing.

Others joined for adventure and still others joined – and this was not an insignificant reason – for “six shillings a day, mate”. It wasn’t bad pay. The British soldier was getting paid just one shilling a day. In my book I tell the story of the Australians who went absolutely crazy in the red light district of Cairo. Our soldiers were very well known in the city and all the ladies of the night wanted an Australian because they had six shillings in their pocket every night, so they were the first in line. Tragically a lot of soldiers got venereal disease and were sent home in disgrace.

Q: Were the Australian troops surprised by the ferocity of the fighting that they encountered at Gallipoli?

A: I think so. It was certainly hell on earth. At the battle of the Nek [on 7 August] you had Australian soldiers charging about 50 yards across open ground with no bullets in their rifles into open machine gun fire and artillery.

And yet the veterans of Gallipoli who then went on to the western front all said: “Look, we thought Gallipoli was bad but we’ve got to the western front and realised we didn’t know anything.” There, the German artillery was so overwhelming and so precise that some Australians almost looked back on Gallipoli with nostalgia. We lost 46,000 killed on the western front, which almost makes the 9,000 lost at Gallipoli pale into insignificance. But still Gallipoli is writ so large in the Australian psyche. I think if you tapped most Australians for their military knowledge, 90 per cent of it would start and finish at Gallipoli and 90 per cent of that would centre on the first day.

Q: How did the Australians view the Turks they were fighting?

A: Early on they had little respect for them: “Let us at these Turks and we’ll sort them out.” Yet, even though the Ottoman empire was on its knees by this time, it was nevertheless an empire with hundreds of years of martial tradition. These men knew what they were doing they believed in their cause they were very courageous and fought very hard.

The story I most love in my book concerns an incident on 24 May 1915. After one month of fighting, no man’s land at Anzac Cove was filled with stinking dead bodies, and a truce was arranged. Both sides came up waving flags and the Turks and Australians began to talk to each other. The Turks had one particular question for the Australians, which was: “Who are you?” The Australians would explain: “We’re from Australia.” “Yes, yes we know that,” the Turks would reply, “we looked in the atlas, but why are you here?” And then the Australians would have to explain about being part of the British empire.

The Turks had a respect for the Australians because they knew the punishment they had taken and still held on. And the Australians had a respect for the Turks because they saw the way they kept charging onto their guns, which was extremely courageous. From then on there was empathy between the two sides.

Three days after that meeting, something thumped in front of the Australian trenches and for the first time it didn’t explode. It was a package with a note that said: “To our heroic enemies.” Inside were Turkish cigarettes, which our blokes smoked and thought were pretty good. They wanted to send something back and all they could find were cans of bully beef – some dating back to the Boer War, reputedly. They threw some over to the Turks and a minute later it came back with a note: “No more bully beef!”

Recently I was speaking to our former prime minister Bob Hawke and I asked him what was the most moving time in his period of office. He said that it was the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, in 1990. They flew back 53 diggers – most of whom were 90 or 95 years old – and when they got there, who should pull up, but 100-odd Turkish soldiers of the same vintage? These two groups of very old men walked towards each other across the same no man’s land where they had first met 75 years earlier. Our blokes put out their hands – let bygones be bygones – but that wasn’t good enough for the Turks. They pushed away their hands and gave them bear hugs, kissing them on both cheeks. There was still this extraordinary respect between the Turks and Australians.

Q: That’s a remarkable story, considering that the Australians had originally come to invade their country…

A: It’s very interesting you use that phrase. In my introduction, I explain how, like most Australians, I took Gallipoli in with my mother’s milk. I studied it at school and at university. It’s in my bones, part of the Australian birthright.

Then, in 1999, I was listening to ABC Radio in the car and a historian said, “when Australia invaded Turkey” and I just about ran off the road! ‘Invaded’ seemed like such an ugly word but then thinking about it that’s what it was, really. But in Australia we just didn’t think of it as an invasion – I dare say similar to the fact that we still don’t think of our dispossession of the indigenous people as an invasion. But what else would you call it if you were an indigenous person and you saw the big ships arrive?

Q: One debate you bring out in the book is the question of how heroic the Australian troops really were at Gallipoli. Have you formed a view about that issue?

A: Cecil Aspinall-Oglander was on the staff of [Gallipoli commander] General Hamilton and became a British war historian afterwards. He wrote that some of the Australians had run away on that first day – which does not fit with our national image – but I imagine that some of it was true.

I often wonder what I would have done if I had been in the third wave at the battle of the Nek. The first wave of 150 Australian soldiers was just completely slaughtered, as was the second one. If I would have been in the third wave, would I have given in to civilian sanity and said: “I’m not going to do that. My job is not to give my life for my country, my job is to make some other poor bastard give his life for his country”? Had I landed on the shores of Gallipoli, looked up and seen machine guns firing and shrapnel coming down at me, what would I have done? The numbers are disputed, but certainly some Australians gave in to that and refused to fight – just as I dare say some Brits did at Cape Helles – but the majority went forwards.

Against all the accusations of cowardice, when I go to Anzac Cove and see that beach, I look up and think: “God help me, how the hell did those bastards hold on for as long as they did? They never had the higher ground, never had sufficient supplies, never had as many machine gun bullets, or as much artillery, or as many men.” There is no doubt the Australians did very well, as did the Kiwis and the Brits, to hold on against overwhelming numbers.

Q: How do you think we should remember the Gallipoli campaign now?

A: I strongly believe that we should commemorate, not celebrate, this centenary. When I wander through the graveyards and see the ages of those who died and read about the circumstances of their deaths, I feel that we need to understand their world, what they did and why it happened. As that great line from Rudyard Kipling says: “Lest we forget.”

Peter FitzSimons is an Australian journalist and author whose work includes several history books.


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