A Guerra Fria - Uma nova História por John Lewis Gaddis - História

A Guerra Fria - Uma nova História por John Lewis Gaddis - História

Islamist por Ed Husain

revisado por Marc Schulman

The Islamist, de Ed Husain, é um livro assustador. Husain nasceu na Inglaterra, filho de pais que vieram da Índia e do Paquistão. Sua família era muçulmana observadora, mas moderada. O livro narra a história de sua transformação de um muçulmano moderado em um "slamist" radical. Ele abraçou os objetivos de estabelecer um estado islâmico para substituir todo e qualquer estado existente no mundo. À medida que se tornava cada vez mais radical, ele começou a acreditar que aqueles que não eram muçulmanos eram inferiores e não dignos. Husain estava fortemente envolvido no College in England em uma série de grupos muçulmanos cada vez mais radicais, que conquistavam um número cada vez maior de eleitores.

Husain começou a questionar suas crenças. Sua primeira revelação ocorreu quando viu que o mais radical de todos os islâmicos matava um companheiro muçulmano. Ele se perguntou sobre o que se falava sobre um futuro estado isálmico se os muçulmanos pudessem matar outros muçulmanos. Husain também começou a questionar as crenças de seus companheiros radicais sobre o status das mulheres. Lentamente, Husain rejeitou a mais radical de suas crenças, embora permanecesse um muçulmano comprometido.

Husain abraçou um sufismo islâmico mais espiritual. As crenças de Husain foram abaladas ainda mais pelos eventos de 11 de setembro. Ele descreve as posições "impopulares" tomadas por alguns de seus professores contra os atentados. A maioria dos muçulmanos radicais na Inglaterra apoiou os ataques de acordo com Husain. Husain foi com sua esposa passar um tempo na Síria, tanto estudando árabe quanto ensinando inglês. Lá ele redescobriu sua identidade inglesa. Ele ficou chocado quando as pessoas que conheceu na Síria foram alegremente para a Jihad no Iraque para defender o regime de Saddam Hussein.

Uma das passagens mais assustadoras do livro ocorre no final, quando Husain e sua esposa passam um tempo na Arábia Saudita. Ele descreve detalhadamente a abordagem fundamentalista do wahhabismo, que graças à riqueza do petróleo da Arábia Saudita se espalhou amplamente. Husain vai almoçar com um casal que considera moderno e ocidental. Quando ele lhes pergunta se eles achavam que havia uma conexão entre o que é ensinado nas escolas sauditas e o 11 de setembro, a resposta que obteve foi “Não, não, porque os sauditas não estavam por trás do 11 de setembro. Os sequestradores de aviões não eram homens sauditas. Mil duzentos e quarenta e seis judeus estavam ausentes do trabalho naquele dia e há provas de que foram eles, os judeus, os responsáveis ​​pelas matanças e não os sauditas ”. Pouco antes de ele partir para retornar à Inglaterra, vários de seus alunos de inglês perguntam como podem ir para a Inglaterra e se tornarem homens-bomba. Husain afirma que essas crenças são amplamente difundidas na Arábia Saudita e refletem as visões que foram amplamente difundidas em todo o mundo pela exportação do wahhabismo.

Em passagem presciente no final do livro (você pode ver um grande trecho abaixo) ele alerta contra o Islã wahabista sendo pregado dentro das prisões americanas e a possibilidade de transformar prisioneiros comuns em futuros terroristas. O islamista é um livro que deve ser lido!

Posfácio: E quanto à América? por Ed Husain, autor de The Islamist: Por que me tornei um fundamentalista islâmico, o que vi por dentro e por que saí

O seio da América está aberto para receber não só o estrangeiro opulento e respeitado, mas também os oprimidos e perseguidos de todas as nações e religiões; a quem acolheremos para uma participação de todos os nossos direitos e privilégios. - George Washington, 1783

Se forem bons trabalhadores, podem ser da Ásia, da África ou da Europa; eles podem ser maometanos, judeus ou cristãos de qualquer seita, ou podem ser ateus. - George Washington, em uma carta a Tench Telghman, 1784

Foi minha primeira visita aos Estados Unidos. Eu esperava ser parado no aeroporto, perseguido, interrogado e talvez detido. Desde o 11 de setembro, as comunidades muçulmanas em todo o mundo estão repletas de histórias horríveis de encontros em aeroportos americanos. Meu amigo dos tempos de faculdade, Majid Nawaz, que havia passado quatro anos como prisioneiro político no Egito, estava comigo. Juntos, participamos de inúmeros comícios antiamericanos na Grã-Bretanha e testemunhamos muitos rituais de queima de bandeiras dos Estados Unidos. Agora, na casa dos trinta, e depois de uma década no deserto, nós mudamos. Mas será que a América nos entenderia? Será que entenderíamos a América?

Como bons britânicos, esperamos pacientemente na longa fila do aeroporto Washington Dulles. De repente, o nome de Majid foi chamado pelo alto-falante, dizendo-lhe para ir para a frente da fila. Então meu. Estávamos com problemas? Majid havia visitado os Estados Unidos recentemente, aparecendo como testemunha especialista do Comitê de Segurança Interna do Congresso, presidido pelo senador Joe Lieberman. Majid foi um dos líderes mais inteligentes, vociferantes e articulados do Hizb ut-Tahrir, viajando para o Paquistão, Dinamarca e Egito defendendo as idéias do grupo e estabelecendo células secretas. O Hizb, em essência, era idêntico à Al-Qaeda, diferindo apenas em termos das táticas que escolheu para alcançar o resultado desejado: poder político. Majid foi banido em vários países e é procurado pelo ISI do Paquistão, sua agência de inteligência. Mas ele recentemente rejeitou o extremismo e, após anos de estudo e reflexão na prisão, tornou-se um defensor público da democracia liberal, usando evidências bíblicas para apoiar muçulmanos pacíficos - que representam a vasta maioria - em sua luta contra o extremismo religioso. Sua rejeição do Hizb ut-Tahrir ganhou as manchetes na imprensa britânica, e o primeiro-ministro britânico citou Majid no parlamento. Mas agora estávamos na América e, durante a recente viagem de Majid, escoltas federais o acompanharam por toda parte, com medo de que ele violasse as normas de segurança dos Estados Unidos e sem saber o que fazer com ele. Será que ele enfrentaria o mesmo destino novamente?

Um oficial da imigração no aeroporto Washington Dulles, acompanhado por vários colegas, nos levou para um lado, registrou os dados do nosso passaporte e pediu ao oficial de recepção que nos liberasse para a entrada. Altos funcionários do Departamento de Segurança Interna dos Estados Unidos esperavam nossa chegada e queriam o mínimo de confusão. A conduta educada e cortês dos oficiais comoveu a nós dois. Mas minha mente estava nos milhares de muçulmanos americanos que haviam sido submetidos a ataques e prisões. Podemos esquecer sua situação?

Fora do aeroporto, eu estava com Majid e fiquei estupefato com o número de bandeiras dos EUA que vi em todos os lugares. Voando a todo vapor em várias junções no estacionamento, e depois acima do aeroporto, e em carros e ônibus, as estrelas e listras eram onipresentes. Ao contrário da Grã-Bretanha, a América era orgulhosamente patriótica e expressava sem reservas o orgulho nacional.

- A bandeira deles é quase sagrada para eles, não é? Eu disse a Majid.

- E os extremistas queimam isso o tempo todo. Por que fizemos isso, Ed? Por que?' ele perguntou, tentando chegar a um acordo sobre como fomos sugados para o extremismo.

- Por que ninguém nos parou? Eu perguntei em resposta. 'Vimos isso acontecer em Londres, não em Bagdá - o que nos deu?'

Majid e eu nos lembramos de como vários de nossos colegas ativistas se tornaram homens-bomba, foram presos ou criaram organizações inteiras que se ligavam à Al-Qaeda. O que começou como mera conversa, como retórica, encontrou expressão em assassinatos em massa em várias capitais europeias, incluindo Londres e Madrid. O assassinato que testemunhamos em nosso campus universitário uma década antes dos ataques ao metrô de Londres em 7 de julho de 2005 foi uma prova indescritível do poder das palavras. A conversa sobre jihad, ódio e raiva nunca permanece abstrata, limitada à 'liberdade de expressão'. Produz resultados.

Mais do que qualquer outra coisa, o que preocupava Majid e a mim era a falta de consciência da sociedade em geral sobre as raízes do extremismo e do estilo de vida que fomenta o recrutamento para movimentos extremistas. O fracasso demonstrado da sociedade em compreender a urgência da situação também foi preocupante, porque essa compreensão pode precipitar políticas e ações que poderiam impedir que jovens muçulmanos se tornassem ideólogos fanáticos comprometidos com a criação de um mundo dominado pelo islamismo, não pelo islamismo. Para ajudar a preencher esse vazio, Majid e eu criamos a Fundação Quilliam, o primeiro think-tank do mundo empenhado em explicar e combater o pensamento islâmico.

Estávamos nos Estados Unidos para falar em Harvard e Princeton, em uma série de think tanks de Washington e encontrar muçulmanos nas costas leste e oeste. Conversamos com líderes de vários departamentos governamentais, embaixadores dos EUA, líderes acadêmicos e estudantes. E em todos os lugares que íamos, nos perguntavam uma série semelhante de perguntas críticas. A América pode criar terroristas caseiros? Os muçulmanos americanos, como os muçulmanos britânicos, atacarão sua própria pátria em nome de um falso islã? A Grã-Bretanha é o lar de mais de 3.000 extremistas: pode a América abrigar inimigos sem saber? Os sequestradores do 11 de setembro planejaram sua trama na Europa: os islamistas nascidos nos Estados Unidos são capazes de uma monstruosidade semelhante?

Minhas respostas a essas perguntas, depois de encontrar alguns muçulmanos americanos e consultar especialistas americanos nessas questões, são sim e não. O texto acima é um trecho do livro O islâmico: Por que me tornei um fundamentalista islâmico, o que vi por dentro e por que saí, de Ed Husain. O trecho acima é uma reprodução digitalizada de texto impresso. Embora este trecho tenha sido revisado, erros ocasionais podem aparecer devido ao processo de digitalização. Por favor, consulte o livro acabado para ver a exatidão.

Reproduzido por acordo com a Penguin, membro do Penguin Group (USA) Inc., de The Islamist por Ed Husain. Copyright © 2009 por Penguin.

O autor bio Ed Husain, autor de O islâmico: Por que me tornei um fundamentalista islâmico, o que vi por dentro e por que saí, foi um radical islâmico por cinco anos no final da adolescência e início dos 20 anos. Tendo rejeitado o extremismo, ele viajou muito pelo Oriente Médio e trabalhou para o Conselho Britânico na Síria e na Arábia Saudita. Husain recebeu ampla e variada aclamação por The Islamist, que foi selecionado para o Prêmio Orwell de redação política e o Prêmio PEN / Ackerley de autobiografia literária, entre outros. Ele é co-fundador da Quillium Foundation, o primeiro grupo de estudos contra o extremismo muçulmano da Grã-Bretanha. Ele mora em Londres com sua esposa e filha.

Envie comentários para [email protected]



Crítica clássica: A Guerra Fria - Uma Nova História

[Esta análise dos arquivos do Monitor foi originalmente executada em 20 de dezembro de 2005]. Quatorze anos atrás, em dezembro de 1991, o líder soviético Mikhail Gorbachev disse a seu país que a guerra fria havia acabado. Ao assinar o decreto que dissolveu a União Soviética e encerrou a competição Leste-Oeste, Gorbachev também anunciou o fim da corrida armamentista e da "militarização insana" que havia "distorcido" o pensamento de seu país e "minado" sua moral. E talvez o mais significativo, ele afirmou que "a ameaça de uma guerra mundial" havia chegado ao fim.

Com o fim do Estado soviético, o mundo parecia pronto para entrar em uma era em que o medo de uma guerra catastrófica não perseguiria mais a humanidade. Muitos acreditavam que os perigos da Guerra Fria dariam lugar a uma era mais tranquila.

Mas não era para ser. O medo de ontem de mísseis balísticos intercontinentais chovendo em Nova York ou Washington foi suplantado pelo medo atual de ataques suicidas e bombas sujas.

E agora, quando embarcar em um avião faz muitas pessoas hesitarem, olhamos quase com saudade para as décadas do pós-guerra, quando os Estados Unidos pareciam entender seu adversário e acreditavam que os líderes russos provavelmente não agiriam irracionalmente. Afinal, a lógica fria da guerra fria significava que um ataque soviético aos Estados Unidos levaria a uma resposta rápida e devastadora.

Enquanto os líderes dos EUA se esforçam para administrar os atuais dilemas da América no exterior, A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História por John Lewis Gaddis nos transporta para uma era anterior. Em detalhes luminosos, Gaddis, o professor de história Robert A. Lovett em Yale, traça a história do conflito que dominou a política mundial desde o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial até o início dos anos 1990. Há quanto tempo tudo parece.

Gaddis, o historiador da Guerra Fria mais ilustre da América, escreve sobre o assunto há mais de 30 anos. (Eu coeditei um livro sobre diplomacia nuclear com Gaddis e dois outros acadêmicos em 1999).

Mas ao contrário de vários de seus livros anteriores, que foram destinados a estudiosos, este é voltado para um público mais amplo - para aqueles que querem entender como a guerra fria começou, como se desenrolou e por que terminou quando terminou.

Dados esses objetivos, Gaddis teve um sucesso esplêndido. Na verdade, na varredura narrativa do livro, percepções analíticas e incorporação hábil da bolsa de estudos mais recente, Gaddis escreveu o melhor tratamento de um volume da luta Leste-Oeste. Ao examinar como líderes individuais, ideologias diferentes, política doméstica e a ameaça nuclear moldaram a competição, ele produziu um trabalho totalmente estimulante.

Avaliando as origens da guerra fria, um assunto que há muito gerou um acirrado debate entre os historiadores, Gaddis atribui a responsabilidade pelo conflito a Stalin e à União Soviética. (Alguns historiadores atribuem aos Estados Unidos a responsabilidade primária, enquanto outros afirmam que tanto Moscou quanto Washington eram os culpados.)

A chave, afirma Gaddis, é que os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética tinham visões fundamentalmente diferentes para o mundo do pós-guerra. Os americanos possuíam uma visão multilateral que buscava evitar a guerra incentivando a cooperação entre as grandes potências, promovendo a autodeterminação política e a integração econômica e contando com as Nações Unidas para aumentar a segurança de todos os Estados.

Mas a visão de Stalin no pós-guerra não poderia ter sido mais diferente. O ditador soviético buscou promover os interesses russos estabelecendo um anel de estados subservientes (não-democráticos) ao redor do vulnerável flanco ocidental de seu país, enquanto esperava as rivalidades inevitáveis ​​que ele acreditava que causariam fissuras e talvez até guerra entre as nações capitalistas.

Como observa Gaddis, Stalin estava convencido de que o "fratricídio capitalista" acabaria permitindo que os soviéticos dominassem a Europa.

Além de explorar as origens do conflito, Gaddis avalia soberbamente como as armas nucleares e a ideologia influenciaram a luta. A bomba ajudou a manter a paz entre Moscou e Washington porque usá-la significou uma resposta certa e cataclísmica. Portanto, não era uma opção legítima para formuladores de políticas racionais.

No campo ideológico, Gaddis escreve que a ideologia de cada estado era "destinada a oferecer esperança" (como fazem todas as ideologias). Mas enquanto uma ideologia dependia da "criação do medo" para funcionar, a outra não tinha "necessidade de fazê-lo". E isso, afirma ele, explica a "assimetria ideológica básica" da guerra fria.

Para surpresa até dos observadores mais astutos, a Guerra Fria chegou ao fim rapidamente entre 1989 e 1991. Embora as ações de Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan e Papa João Paulo II tenham contribuído para a conclusão pacífica do conflito, os líderes mundiais não foram central para encerrar a competição. As ações das "pessoas comuns" foram cruciais, acredita Gaddis, pois foram os cidadãos de Budapeste, Varsóvia, Leipzig, Praga e Bucareste que corajosamente se livraram das algemas que os prendiam por tanto tempo.

Para ter certeza, Gorbachev decidiu que Moscou não estava mais preparada para manter a velha ordem repressiva. Mas a libertação de milhões foi catalisada por homens e mulheres normais que tinham a capacidade de imaginar uma existência melhor e a vontade de alcançá-la.

Houve poucos momentos mais edificantes na história do século 20, e é fácil refletir sobre aqueles dias heróicos com certa melancolia.

Jonathan Rosenberg ensina história americana no Hunter College, a City University of New York.


A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História

O "decano dos historiadores da Guerra Fria" (O jornal New York Times) agora apresenta o relato definitivo do confronto global que dominou a última metade do século XX. Baseando-se em arquivos recém-abertos e nas reminiscências dos principais jogadores, John Lewis Gaddis explica não apenas o que aconteceu, mas porque—Desde os meses de 1945 quando os EUA e os EUA foram da aliança ao antagonismo, ao holocausto mal evitado da crise dos mísseis cubanos e às manobras de Nixon e Mao, Reagan e Gorbachev. Brilhante, acessível, quase shakespeariano em seu drama, A guerra Fria representa uma soma triunfante da era que, mais do que qualquer outra, moldou a nossa.

Gaddis também é o autor de Na Grande Estratégia.

Отзывы - Написать отзыв

A GUERRA FRIA: Uma Nova História

Gaddis, estudioso da Guerra Fria, apresenta um breve, mas abrangente, relato do que JFK chamou de nossa "luta do crepúsculo". Após a derrota das potências do Eixo na Segunda Guerra Mundial, as democracias ocidentais se enfrentaram. Читать весь отзыв

A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História

Ambos os livros tratam da Guerra Fria sem pisar nos calcanhares um do outro. Gaddis (história, Yale Univ. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience) é um dos principais estudiosos do frio. Читать весь отзыв


A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História Detalhes em PDF

Autor: John Lewis Gaddis
Título original: A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História
Formato do livro: ebook
Número de páginas: 352 páginas
Publicado pela primeira vez em: 29 de dezembro de 2005
Última edição: 26 de dezembro de 2006
Língua: inglês
Prêmios: Prêmio de livro Harry S. Truman (2006)
categoria: história, não ficção, política, guerra, história norte-americana, história americana, história, história mundial, cultural, russia, acadêmico, escola, história, história russa, história, história europeia
Formatos: ePUB (Android), mp3 audível, audiolivro e kindle.

A versão traduzida deste livro está disponível em espanhol, inglês, chinês, russo, hindi, bengali, árabe, português, indonésio / malaio, francês, japonês, alemão e muitos outros para download gratuito.

Observe que os truques ou técnicas listados neste pdf são fictícios ou afirmam que funcionam por seu criador. Não garantimos que essas técnicas funcionem para você.

Algumas das técnicas listadas em A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História podem exigir um conhecimento sólido da Hipnose. Os usuários são aconselhados a deixar essas seções ou devem ter um conhecimento básico do assunto antes de praticá-las.

DMCA e direitos autorais: O livro não está hospedado em nossos servidores, para remover o arquivo entre em contato com o url de origem. Se você vir um link do Google Drive em vez do URL de origem, significa que o arquivo que você receberá após a aprovação é apenas um resumo do livro original ou o arquivo já foi removido.


A Guerra Fria - Uma nova História por John Lewis Gaddis - História

A Guerra Fria sempre foi objeto de intenso debate - foi necessário, foi justo, por que aconteceu e como terminou - e tem sido um tema desafiador para os professores. Mais de 40 professores de 17 estados e dois países estrangeiros se reuniram neste Instituto de História para ouvir cinco especialistas apresentarem as melhores e mais recentes ideias sobre a Guerra Fria e suas lições. Agora é um momento particularmente empolgante para fazer um balanço desta importante questão da história americana e mundial. Novas evidências, tanto da ex-União Soviética quanto do Ocidente, estão derrubando opiniões recebidas. Agora sabemos mais do que há dez anos, mas menos do que saberemos no futuro.

John Lewis Gaddis é professor de história Robert A. Lovett na Universidade de Yale. Seu livro mais recente é We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Fora do cachorro, o livro é o melhor amigo do homem. Dentro de um cachorro, está escuro demais para ler. —Groucho Marx

Gosto dessa citação do outro Marx porque sugere o quão limitada nossa visão da Guerra Fria, até bem recentemente, tem sido de fato. Em contraste com a forma como a maior parte da história é escrita, os historiadores da Guerra Fria até o final da década de 1980 estavam trabalhando dentro, e não depois, do evento que tentavam descrever. Não tínhamos como saber o resultado final e podíamos determinar as motivações de apenas alguns - mas não de todos - dos atores principais. Estávamos em algo como a posição daqueles intrigados poseurs Rosencrantz e Guildenstern no Hamlet de Shakespeare, imaginando o que no mundo estava acontecendo e como tudo iria acabar.

Agora sabemos, para cunhar uma frase. Ou, pelo menos, sabemos muito mais do que antes. Nunca teremos a história completa: não temos isso para nenhum evento histórico, não importa quão longe no passado. Os historiadores não podem reconstruir o que realmente aconteceu, assim como os mapas não podem replicar o que realmente está lá. Mas podemos representar o passado, assim como os cartógrafos aproximam o terreno. E com o fim da Guerra Fria e pelo menos a abertura parcial de documentos da ex-União Soviética, Europa Oriental e China, o ajuste entre nossas representações e a realidade que eles descrevem tornou-se muito mais próximo do que antes.

Então, o que tudo isso significa? Do que trata a nova história da Guerra Fria - isto é, histórias da Guerra Fria escritas após o fim da Guerra Fria?

Em primeiro lugar, está claro agora que, ao contrário do que os historiadores e teóricos das relações internacionais esperavam quando a Guerra Fria começou, os governos democráticos se comportaram de maneira mais realista do que seus homólogos autoritários. Por realismo, quero dizer a capacidade de alinhar as ações de uma pessoa com seus interesses. O fato de a Guerra Fria ter terminado como terminou - com o mundo mais democrático do que nunca - sugere fortemente que o autoritarismo deu origem a ilusões com mais frequência do que a políticas eficazes.

Agora sabemos quais eram algumas dessas ilusões. Stalin, por exemplo, acreditou até o dia de sua morte que os estados capitalistas nunca se uniriam para conter o expansionismo soviético. Porque? Porque Lenin havia ensinado que os capitalistas eram gananciosos demais para cooperar uns com os outros: essa ideia deixou o líder soviético mal equipado para lidar com iniciativas como o Plano Marshall, a OTAN e a reintegração da Alemanha e do Japão em um sistema dirigido pelos americanos de alianças. Mao Zedong, também por razões ideológicas, via a União Soviética como um aliado da recém-criada República Popular da China, essa visão também, com o tempo, ele teve que repensar. E Nikita Khrushchev arriscou o destino de seu país e possivelmente de todo o mundo ao colocar mísseis em Cuba em 1962, na esperança absurda de que isso pudesse de alguma forma garantir a propagação da revolução de Castro por toda a América Latina.

O que esses erros têm em comum é uma visão romântica e não realista do mundo: a pessoa tem uma certa ideia na cabeça, como o Dom Quixote de Cervantes, e em um sistema autoritário ninguém está em posição de dizer ao líder máximo que suas conclusões não fazem sentido. Os líderes democratas muitas vezes não eram mais sábios. Mas os sistemas democráticos pelo menos forneceram maneiras de desafiar as ilusões do topo quando surgiram e, em última análise, remover os líderes que persistiam em mantê-las. Longe de serem estados progressistas, então, a União Soviética, seus satélites do Leste Europeu e a China funcionaram por muitos anos como monarquias absolutas, com todas as possibilidades de ilusões impraticáveis ​​que tal sistema acarreta.

Em segundo lugar, e como consequência, os historiadores da Guerra Fria estão dando mais peso do que antes ao papel das idéias na formação desse conflito. Tradicionalmente, tínhamos visto a Guerra Fria como um choque de grandes potências - como uma continuação das rivalidades que caracterizaram as relações internacionais durante os séculos XVIII, XIX e início do século XX. Calculamos o poder em termos de índices materiais, dando maior ênfase às capacidades militares que existiam em cada lado. Apesar do fato de os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética serem Estados fortemente ideológicos, nem os historiadores nem os teóricos das relações internacionais tenderam a dar atenção suficiente ao conteúdo comparativo dessas ideologias, ou até que ponto elas obtiveram o apoio das pessoas que teve que viver com eles.

O que podemos ver agora, porém, é que uma das superpotências da Guerra Fria - a União Soviética - entrou em colapso abrupta e completamente, apesar do fato de que sua força militar permaneceu intacta. Isso sugere fortemente que nós, que estudamos a Guerra Fria por muitos anos, negligenciamos os componentes não militares do poder e, especialmente, o papel das idéias. Pois o marxismo-leninismo era em si uma ideia, que por sua vez determinava como a União Soviética e os outros estados socialistas organizavam seu poder, sua política, sua economia e, em última análise, os apelos que faziam a seu próprio povo, bem como àqueles além de suas fronteiras . E, como os eventos de 1989-91 mostram muito claramente, essa ideia já havia perdido sua legitimidade.

A história da Guerra Fria é, portanto, a história de como a União Soviética e seus aliados conseguiram esbanjar seu apelo ideológico ao longo de muitos anos, enquanto as democracias ocidentais mantiveram e até expandiram o seu próprio. No final das contas, o que as pessoas pensavam era muito mais importante do que os estados poderiam fazer - e isso é uma grande mudança em relação a como nós concebíamos anteriormente a história da Guerra Fria.

O padrão, em retrospecto, era claro no início dos anos 1960. O capitalismo havia revivido e o histórico das economias de comando não mostrava sinais de igualar. O marxismo-leninismo sofreu reveses devastadores com a supressão da revolução húngara em 1956, a eclosão da divisão sino-soviética e a humilhação da crise dos mísseis cubanos. A Alemanha e o Japão haviam sido reintegrados com sucesso ao bloco de defesa ocidental na época, e o Ocidente estava bem à frente no armamento nuclear. Por que, então, a Guerra Fria não terminou naquele ponto?

Aqui, há ainda uma terceira nova visão da história da Guerra Fria: é que as armas nucleares se estabilizaram, mas provavelmente também prolongaram esse conflito. Há muito tempo que suspeitamos que essas armas desencorajaram a escalada do tipo que havia feito com que as crises anteriores à Guerra Fria levassem a guerras quentes. A Guerra Fria foi cheia de crises, nenhuma delas escalou para uma guerra total e, nesse sentido, as armas nucleares foram benéficas.

Em outro sentido, porém, eles podem ter estendido a Guerra Fria além do ponto em que, de outra forma, poderia ter terminado. As armas nucleares eram tão impressionantes - e o mundo aparentemente havia chegado tão perto de vê-las usadas durante a crise dos mísseis cubanos - que se desenvolveu a tendência de medir o poder mundial quase inteiramente em termos de capacidades nucleares e de negligenciar suas outras dimensões de poder. Era como se, ao avaliar a saúde de algum grande animal, alguém olhasse apenas para seus armamentos externos, sem prestar atenção ao funcionamento de seu cérebro, coração e fígado. Esse animal teria uma aparência formidável até o dia em que repentinamente tombasse e morresse.

O que as armas nucleares fizeram, então, foi ocultar a condição de um estado envelhecido, terrivelmente armado, mas em deterioração interna. Com sua morte repentina, a Guerra Fria acabou repentinamente.

Isso traz um ponto final, embora controverso: podemos realmente separar a Guerra Fria da própria União Soviética? Esse estado poderia ter funcionado em qualquer outro ambiente? Vale lembrar que a Revolução Bolchevique foi em si uma declaração de guerra fria contra todos os outros estados do sistema internacional da época. Nenhum líder soviético até Mikhail Gorbachev negou o objetivo de derrubar o capitalismo em todos os lugares, por mais distante que essa perspectiva possa parecer. A União Soviética era, portanto, um estado configurado exclusivamente para a Guerra Fria - e tornou-se muito mais difícil, agora que o conflito terminou, ver como poderia ter feito isso sem que a própria União Soviética tivesse passado do cena.

A história da Guerra Fria está finalmente se tornando uma história normal, no sentido de que podemos finalmente escrevê-la de um ponto de vista de Rosencrantz e Guildenstern. Finalmente conseguimos sair do cachorro de Groucho e agora é muito mais fácil ver o que está acontecendo. Dado nosso caráter contencioso, os historiadores não estão dispostos a concordar, agora ou nas próximas décadas, sobre os detalhes precisos e o que eles significam. Podemos pelo menos aceitar o fato, porém, de que a vista é estimulante.


A Guerra Fria: uma nova história

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Olhe para trás em relevo

EM 1991, enquanto a União Soviética estava se desintegrando, um dos altos funcionários da política externa do presidente George HW Bush & # x27s me disse: "Vocês, historiadores, terão dificuldade em explicar aos americanos do futuro por que pensamos que a Guerra Fria era tão perigoso por 45 anos. ”Ele estava certo. Em 2006, os americanos muito jovens para ter vivido a era dos exercícios de pato e cobertura exigem um estudioso de dons extraordinários para dizer por que nove presidentes da Guerra Fria desdobraram nosso tesouro nacional contra um império que se desfez tão desajeitadamente no final.

John Lewis Gaddis é esse estudioso, e "A Guerra Fria: Uma Nova História" é o livro que eles deveriam ler. Professor de história em Yale, Gaddis é autor de seis volumes renomados sobre a guerra fria - especialmente as estratégias de ambos os lados - que foram escritos durante ou logo após a luta.

Ninguém fez um trabalho melhor ao tentar explicar o conflito como ele ainda estava se desenrolando, o que para um historiador é como tentar descrever uma floresta inteira correndo por ela a cavalo à meia-noite. Mas com esta sucinta e auto-

Livro seguro, Gaddis agora desfruta do luxo de pairar alto acima das árvores na luz do sol brilhante, usando a informação outrora secreta e retrospectiva de que um estudioso precisa para escrever a história verdadeira.

Ele não finge que todos os seus julgamentos anteriores estavam corretos. Por exemplo, tendo insistido em 1987 que a guerra fria tinha evoluído para uma "paz longa" estável que duraria indefinidamente, Gaddis agora está feliz em admitir que "visionários" como João Paulo II, Lech Walesa, Margaret Thatcher e Ronald Reagan tinham um senso mais amplo do que ele fez da & possibilidade quothistórica. & quot

Gaddis & # x27s novas abordagens sobre os líderes e episódios da era & # x27s provavelmente terão uma enorme influência. With relief he notes that the secret combat between American and Soviet planes during the Korean conflict was ultimately the only shooting war that ever developed between the sides during the entire cold war.

He is convinced that Nikita Khrushchev slipped missiles into Cuba "chiefly as an effort, improbable as this might seem, to spread revolution throughout Latin America," allowing his "ideological romanticism to overrun whatever capacity he had for strategic analysis." And with horror and admiration, he describes Dwight D. Eisenhower's subtle effort to prevent nuclear war by ensuring that no such conflict could ever be limited. At the end of his presidency, Ike's single-war plan, if it had ever been carried out, would have resulted in more than 3,000 nuclear weapons being dropped on all Communist nations. By the 1970's, Eisenhower's strategy evolved into "mutual assured destruction" and a treaty limiting both sides in defending themselves against long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles.

Knowing how the cold war ended allows re-evaluation of each act of the drama. So Gaddis is now able to lament how the Nixon-Kissinger détente bought stability at the cost of disillusioning hundreds of millions of Communist-dominated peoples who had hoped some day to be able to choose their own leaders. Yet he also provides a fresh appreciation of the 1975 Helsinki accord signed by Gerald Ford. Although Reagan and other conservatives despised Helsinki for reinforcing the division of Europe, Gaddis shows how it created a new and potent forum for dissidents and critics inside and outside the Soviet Union: "Begun by the Kremlin in an effort to legitimize Soviet control . . . the Helsinki process became instead the basis for legitimizing opposition to Soviet rule."

Then there are those Gaddis calls the "saboteurs of the status quo" -- John Paul II, Reagan, Thatcher and other leaders who believed the West had paid too high a moral and political price for its long peace with Moscow. They demanded something better. John Paul, for example, gives Gaddis the chance to recall Stalin's contemptuous question about an earlier pope: "How many divisions has he got?" John Paul, Gaddis explains, didn't need divisions. He mobilized spiritual force against Communism when he returned to Poland in 1979 and then embraced Lech Walesa's Solidarity movement.

Reagan was another saboteur. He strove to shatter the East-West stalemate "by exploiting Soviet weaknesses and asserting Western strengths." Few -- even among his supporters -- glimpsed Reagan's genuine passion to abolish nuclear arsenals, which he considered immoral. Many American academics decried Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 as a warmongering effort to extend the cold war into the heavens. But while conceding the risks (the Soviets feared a first-strike attack), Gaddis praises Reagan's strategy of using the threat to build an antimissile shield that the Soviets could not soon match. "If the U.S.S.R. was crumbling," Gaddis asks, "what could justify . . . continuing to hold Americans hostage to the . . . odious concept of mutual assured destruction? Why not hasten the disintegration?"

Gaddis also takes the measure of Mikhail Gorbachev, comparing him unfavorably to the pope, Reagan and Thatcher. "They all had destinations in mind and maps for reaching them," he writes, whereas "Gorbachev dithered in contradictions without resolving them. . . . And so, in the end, he gave up an ideology, an empire and his own country, in preference to using force." It was a policy that "made little sense in traditional geopolitical terms," Gaddis observes. "But it did make him the most deserving recipient ever of the Nobel Peace Prize."

Gaddis does not make the mistake of restricting his history to the rulers. Quite the contrary. He demonstrates how it was unfamous men and women who fueled the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics -- for instance, those Hungarians of 1989 who "declared their barbed wire obsolete" and defied the Kremlin to stop them. In the face of such unheard-of challenges, Gaddis says, the "leaders -- astonished, horrified, exhilarated, emboldened, at a loss, without a clue -- struggled to regain the initiative, but found that they could do so only by acknowledging that what once would have seemed incredible was now inevitable."

Only when an epoch passes can a historian look at the whole and decide what was distinctive about it. "For the first time in history," Gaddis says of the period, "no one could be sure of winning, or even surviving, a great war." By the end of the struggle, "military strength, a defining characteristic of 'power' itself for the past five centuries, ceased to be that."

Gaddis marvels that during the last half of the 20th century the number of democracies quintupled, hastened by the information revolution and the increasingly obvious superiority of free societies in feeding their own people. Thus "the world came closer than ever before to reaching a consensus . . . that only democracy confers legitimacy."

Still, there was nothing inevitable about the cold war's happy ending. Gaddis makes a point of reminding us how easily the conflict could have ended up incinerating much of humanity: "The binoculars of a distant future will confirm this, for had the cold war taken a different course there might have been no one left to look back through them."

We have many symbols to show that the cold war has indeed vanished. Fearsome missiles have been turned into scrap. And on movie screens, James Bond has shifted his telescopic sights from K.G.B. agents to other adversaries. In the same spirit, now that he has delivered his long-awaited retrospective verdict on the cold war, perhaps John Lewis Gaddis will turn his attention to art history.

'The Cold War: A New History,' by John Lewis Gaddis Michael Beschloss, the author, most recently, of "The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945," is writing a book about presidential decision-making through American history.


A New History of the Cold War

Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote seminal books about the Cold War, during the Cold War. In his book, The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis discusses why the West won, and how it shaped the world.

Esta é a TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan, in Washington.

In 1984, I spoke with British historian A.J. Pete Taylor, who had written a book called How Wars End, and I asked him how the Cold War might end. I have no idea, he told me, but I do know that when it does happen it will seem to have been obvious all along.

Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, a prominent scholar of the Cold War, has now written a new history of the long conflict, his first since the Cold War actually did end, where he reexamines the role of ideology and leadership, the strengths and weaknesses of nuclear weapons, the management of alliances, why the West won, why that's important, and how the Cold War shaped our world today.

Later in the program we'll speak with two members of the Senate Judiciary Committee about this week's hearings on warrantless wiretaps, but first, the Cold War. If you have questions about what happened and why, our number here in Washington is 800-989-8255, that's 800-989-TALK. The email address is [email protected]

John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovett professor of history at Yale, and he joins us now from a studio on the campus in New Haven, Connecticut. And welcome to TALK OF THE NATION.

Professor JOHN LEWIS GADDIS (History, Yale University): Thank you. Good to talk to you, Neal.

CONAN: And I wanted to begin by asking you that same question that I put to A.J. Pete Taylor, 20 or 25 years ago. Did you have any idea how the Cold War would end?

Professor GADDIS: No, with all due respect to Professor Taylor, it was certainly not obvious to me in 1984 how the Cold War would end.

CONAN: Well, it wasn't obvious to him either. He just said when it happened, it would be obvious to everybody. It's one of those things.

Professor GADDIS: I'm not sure that's completely true, even to this point. And that's partly why I wrote this book, is to try to step back from that experience and look at what happened from the distance of some fifteen years or so. And I think it's always the case with history, when you back off of it, when time passes, it looks different from the way it looked at the time.

CONAN: And of course, knowing the outcome, it all seems inevitable. But one of the points you make at the beginning of your book was that in 1948 and 1949 it was far from clear which side was going to win this struggle.

Professor GADDIS: I think one of the great challenges for historians is to deny inevitability, because nothing is really inevitable. Things look inevitable after they've happened, but part of our challenge in writing about the past is to show that things could have happened in a quite different way.

CONAN: And indeed, in a couple of circumstances, had things happened in a different way, this world would be dramatically different.

Professor GADDIS: This world might not even be here as we know it if things had happened in a different way in a couple of circumstances.

CONAN: And that's one of the things I wanted to talk to you about. You say that, indeed, the experience of the Cold War goes against the entire history of human nature, which has always been that if you invent a new weapon, well, glory be, let's get to using it.

Professor GADDIS: That's right. I think there are very few instances in history that I can think of in which weapons have been developed and not used. Stones, bows and arrows, slingshots, coming all the way up through bombers and battleships, weapons developed have always been used fairly quickly after their development.

And what's distinctive about the Cold War is that the most powerful of all weapons, nuclear weapons, were developed, they were used twice to end World War II, but then they were not used again. And I think this is a remarkable and astonishing development.

CONAN: Before we get lots of emails, Professor Gaddis does include a caveat for the agreement not to use poison gas during the Second World War, but.

Professor GADDIS: Which was a tacit agreement, not a formal agreement. But it was just a mutual understanding on both sides, but that's the only exception that I can think of.

CONAN: And this is something, you give credit to somebody who is not generally regarded as a great strategist of the Cold War, Dwight David Eisenhower, for coming up with a solution to this problem of nuclear weapons, which was, you say, at the same time brutal and very subtle.

Professor GADDIS: Well by this, I mean Eisenhower, in presiding over war planning in the American government, simply said that the idea that we could fight the limited nuclear war, or a partial nuclear war, was ridiculous, that the only thing to do was to prepare to fight a total, all-out nuclear war. And his gamble was that the prospect of doing that would be sufficiently horrible that nobody on our side or on the other side would ever contemplate doing such a thing. And I think he turned out to be right.

CONAN: Do you, in the end, think that deterrents, in other words, this carefully balanced power between the United States and the Soviet Union in those days, and I'll throw the British and the French in on the American side, sort of, in terms of the French, but the, this great, you know, masses of arsenals. Did deterrents work? Or was it some other mechanism that prevented from blowing each other up?

Professor GADDIS: Well deterrents worked in the sense that we didn't have a Third World War. Part of the problem in assessing this is, did anybody have a plan to start a Third World War in the first place?

I think the evidence on that is still inclusive from the Soviet side. The answer is probably not, but accidents can happen, of course. What strikes me as really significant is that whereas deterrents set out to be something that the Soviets were trying to do to the Americans and the Americans were trying to do to the Soviets, the instruments by which they were doing this, nuclear weapons, wound up deterring both of them. So there was a third party involved, which was the technology itself.

CONAN: There were, for example during the war, and you point out this, you know, mirror-like world where logic didn't seem to obtain very well, and the whole idea of mutual-assured destruction, but the Americans at various points said, we will only target military targets, and as you point out from the receivers end, it would have been hard to tell the difference.

Professor GADDIS: Absolutely. I think it was a totally false distinction, and it was back to this idea that somehow you could fight a controlled nuclear war. It's the idea that Eisenhower simply never bought.

CONAN: And, at the end of the day, you conclude that somehow, by this mutual decision not to use these most terrible of all weapons, that the nature of power was changed by this, by the Cold War.

Professor GADDIS: Well, I think that's right, because, look at the Soviet Union. It collapses with all of its military power, all of its nuclear weapons intact. And yet, it goes down the tubes. So, that kind of power obviously was not very effective. Power is supposed to sustain and support the state, and this kind of power did not.

CONAN: If you'd like to join our conversation with Professor John Lewis Gaddis, the author most recently of The Cold War: A New History, give us a phone call. Our number 800-989-8255, 800-989-TALK. Our email address is [email protected] Excuse me, I got that wrong. Our new e-mail address is [email protected] And, lets talk with Terry. Terry calling us from Mankato, Minnesota.

TERRY: I love your show. I had a question. I was stationed in Wiesbaden, Germany, during the Cold War in 1979 and 1980. And we deployed, we had a deployment of the Folda Gap, where, you know, that's where the big Soviet invasion was supposed to come through the Folda Gap.

Anyway, two people in my platoon, of my company, were killed in a training accident, and just an accident in the billets, and those would be two casualties that were not brought about by any gunfire or any bombs dropping. Now I was just wondering, is there any way of knowing, you know, the total casualties that can be attributed to the Cold War? In a whole.

Professor GADDIS: No, I don't think there is, because when you're deploying military forces, as you know very well, there are all kinds of accidents that happen along the way.

Professor GADDIS: So, I don't think we have anything close to an accurate figure of the number of people who might otherwise have lived if the Cold War had not been fought. I think all we can say is that a lot more people lived for the fact that the Cold War did not somehow get into a hot war.

TERRY: Yes, indeed. I agree with that.

CONAN: And any calculation of casualties, thanks for the call Terry, any calculation of casualties would of course have to include all those killed in the wars in Korea and Vietnam as well,as well as interventions in Afghanistan, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary.

Professor GADDIS: But you would also have to count the casualties, it seems to me, of the internal repression that came from internal repression during the Cold War, or it came from mismanagement during the Cold War. So it's not just battlefield casualties, but it's death by government, and the hugest death toll of all, which is something like 30 million, comes as a result of Mao's policies in China, the Great Leap Forward, which itself was a Cold War development.

CONAN: A Cold War development and in what sense?

Professor GADDIS:A Cold War development and in the sense that Mao is trying to overtake the Soviet Union and, ultimately, to overtake Britain and the United States. And he believed that he could crash industrialization, crash collectivization of agriculture. He believed that he could accelerate economic development, accelerate history itself, and the results were horrendous.

CONAN: Let's get another caller in on the conversation. This is Jim. Jim calling from Canton, Ohio.

JIM (Caller): Yes, I disagree with the precept that the Cold War has ended. I believe it's more of a truce. And I think the evidence of that is that when the Warsaw Pact disbanded in Europe, NATO remained, and not only remained but is expanding. We're expanding into the Baltic States, the caucuses, Central Asia. And in a global perspective, we're surrounding the Soviets, I mean, Russia. And, you know, our power has greatly increased since the so-called end to the Cold War. And further evidence would be the existence of FDI. We're going forward with that. We're going forward with MX missile. There's no nuclear disarmament and we have a militarist government.

CONAN: Is the Cold War really over, John Lewis Gaddis?

Professor GADDIS: Well, that's about five different provocations in that question, it seems to me. Let me deal with the main one, which is the question, is the Cold War over? It depends on whether you capitalize those words Cold War or not.

If you put it in lowercase and say cold war in the sense of rivalries between nations, no, the cold war is still going on. And the cold war went on long before the events of 1945 to 1991.

If you put it in capital letters and say the Cold War as the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the confrontation between capitalism and communism, that's over. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Communism is no longer a sustainable ideology. That's history, and that was the history that I was writing about in the book.

JIM: Why is NATO still in existence? I mean, we lost the reason for that existence after the Warsaw Pact disbanded. And the fact that it's still there tells me that we are on a militaristic aggressive footing. In other words, our presence in Europe is closer to the Russian border than Hitler got at the start of the Second World War.

Professor GADDIS: Well, I think NATO is still there chiefly because the Europeans wish for it to be there. So I think that's a little bit different proposition from saying that it's purely an American aggressive initiative. NATO has come to be, not only convenient, but in many ways, a vital interest for the Europeans as a way of sustaining stability in that part of the world. So if we try to disband it, they would oppose our doing it.

CONAN: Jim, thanks very much for the call.

CONAN: And if you'd like to join our conversation, the number is 800-989-8255 or send us e-mail, [email protected] We'll be back after a short break.

I'm Neil Conan. Você está ouvindo TALK OF THE NATION do NPR News.

CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION, I'm Neil Conan in Washington. Historian John Lewis Gaddis is with us today from Yale University. His new book is The Cold War, a New History. You're invited to join us, of course. Give us a call. 800-989-8255, 800-989-TALK. The e-mail address, [email protected]

And, Professor Gaddis, you were talking a few minutes earlier about the role of ideology. And this is something really, you trace back in terms of the ideological struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Not necessarily just beginning with the Cold War, but beginning with Woodrow Wilson and the Fourteen Points.

Professor GADDIS: Well I would even trace it back earlier than that. I would trace it back to Karl Marx in the middle of the 19th century because there really was a contest over how to organize an economy and from that how to organize a civil society.

And it seems to me much of the question revolved around the issue of whether society is better organized from the top down, in a command economy method, or spontaneously from the bottom up in a way that allows a considerable amount of autonomy for politics and for economic development. And that argument goes all the way back to the middle of the 19th Century, although you're sort of right, it became dramatically intensified with Woodrow Wilson and Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution.

CONAN: And as late as Nikita Khrushchev's time, when he made his we will bury you speech. This was still, communism still represented an economic challenge to the West. Everybody remembered the failures of the Great Depression.

Professor GADDIS: Well, that's correct and that's part of my challenge in teaching this subject to my students because they can't figure out, can't understand how communism could ever have had any significant appeal. So I have to go back to the events of World War I. I have to go back to the events of the Great Depression. I have to go back to the collapse of the democracies in the 1930s that led to World War II, to show them that for anybody who came out of those experiences, both capitalism and democracy could have seemed like very flawed doctrines. And so a more authoritarian solution could have had, and did have, a considerable amount of appeal.

What's interesting about the Cold War is that trend was reversed and some how by about the time that Khrushchev made his we will bury you statement, it was clear that, in fact, that was not going to happen.

CONAN: Let's get some more listeners involved in the conversation. Again 800-989-8255 and why don't we turn to Peter. Peter's with us from Berkeley, California.

CONAN: Peter, are you there?

CONAN: Hello, Peter, can you hear us?

PETER: Yes, can you hear me okay?

CONAN: Yes, you're on the air, please go ahead.

PETER: Had a little bit of a technological glitch. You know, I just wanted to perhaps offer the opinion and it seems that, to some large degree, history depends on who won or who perceives themself to have won and who does the writing.

You know, last year when President Reagan died, there was an awful lot of press coverage to the effect of, you know, how he won the Cold War. And I don't really think that's supported by the historical record, which I think indicates much more strongly that Gorbachev initiated some reforms and he was very interested in, you know, recognized weaknesses in the Soviet system. But that you know in a large part those reforms kind of spun out of control. But, you know, the initiative goes there. Where President Reagan deserves credit, I think, is that he was able to step away from his ideological rigidity and see a bit of an opportunity there.

But now, some years later, we see the Reagan won the Cold War kind of perspective used as kind of an ideological argument for, you know, a great deal of military buildup and militarism. When it's not really, I think, what happened.

Professor GADDIS: Well, I am not going to say that Reagan won the Cold War, but I am going to say that he came close, because it seems to me he played a very important role in this in a couple of different ways. First of all, he was the first major American leader, in my opinion, to ask the question, why did we continue to need to have a Cold War in the first place? The Cold War had become conventional wisdom at the time that he came into office. And he actually looked forward to the possibility that it might end. And he was doing it long before Gorbachev came into power.

As far as military spending is concerned, you're right. He does accelerate military spending somewhat. It had already been accelerated in the Carter Administration, but many people fail to realize that Ronald Reagan was also the only nuclear abolitionist ever to be president of the United States. So he was dedicated to the idea of minimizing the danger of nuclear war. And what he saw was that a military buildup could put the Soviet system under sufficient strain that it would have to choose a leader like Gorbachev. So I do not downplay his role at all. I think it was enormously important.

PETER: Well, I think that, if I may, we were very fortunate that it ended up kind of going the Gorbachev route when it could have gone a very different route, which might have been the same outcome of that approach. But if I might make one other comment. You know, I think, call it divine intervention, you know, we really have little to credit the fact that nuclear weapons haven't been used thus far.

And, you know, I think we count our chickens before they hatch when we say, well, it's remarkable that they haven't been used, because, you know, listeners may or may not know that there's still several thousand nuclear weapons pointed at the United States with a flight time of about 20 minutes, and many of them in a launch on warning footing.

And, you know, there's been some recent articles to the effect that the nuclear situation is being destabilized by some efforts on the part of the Bush Administration to kind of capitalize on a moment of opportunity and put themselves in an even stronger first strike position. So, you know, in a lot of ways the jury's regrettably very out on the use of nuclear weapons. And I think it's more likely a probability than the other way too.

Professor GADDIS: Well, the jury is always out as far as that goes. When it comes to something like this, nuclear weapons are not going to be de-invented, regrettably. But there are two facts that are important here. There are a lot fewer nuclear weapons than there were at the height of the Cold War. There is much less of a deliberate hair trigger strategy of targeting each side, Russians against Americans.

I would agree with you that the likelihood that a nuclear weapon could be used has probably gone up since the Cold War ended. But I think that likelihood resides with the possibility of a terrorist or a rogue state getting hold of one or two nuclear weapons and using them in that way.

The likelihood of a nuclear exchange involving some six or seven thousand nuclear weapons, which is what could have happened in the Cold War, simply is not going to happen in the post-Cold War era.

CONAN: Peter, thanks very much.

CONAN: Bye-bye. Here's an e-mail question from John Milligan(ph) in Washington D.C. He would ask Mr. Gaddis if you would elaborate on the key role of George Kennan and his brilliant containment strategy.

Professor GADDIS: Well I have to say I'm slightly biased, since I am Kennan's biographer, but I think there was one big idea that Kennan articulated. He did this as early as 1947. And it seems to me it's the idea that came closest to defining American strategy in the Cold War. And that idea was simply that we did not have to have a world war with the Soviet Union. We didn't need to fight World War III.

Professor GADDIS: We did not need to appease them either as the democracies did Hitler in the 1930s, but there was a middle way. We could simply build up Western strength, which in his mind, meant chiefly European and Japanese strength. We could build self-confident societies that could sustain themselves and, ultimately, the ambitions and the desires of the Soviet leadership to expend their influence would be frustrated.

And if they met with repeated frustration, they would eventually change their policies, they would change their system, they would change their leaders. And it seems to me this is precisely what happened in the 1980s. So Kennan looks, in retrospect, very prophetic in that regard.

CONAN: Kennan also was someone who endorsed activities by the Central Intelligence Agency. These were basically operations where, as you put it, the United States seemingly had felt it had to act as ruthlessly as its opponents. And as you quote Mr. Kennan much later admitting, It did not work out at all the way I had conceived it.

Professor GADDIS: Well, Kennan did not and would never have made the argument that the United States had to act as ruthlessly as its opponents did. What he did advocate and was the first to advocate was that the CIA should be given some covert action capability, but he favored keeping it extremely limited. He favored keeping it rarely used, and he favored keeping it under the tight control of the State Department.

What happened was that once established, the CIA took on a life of its own, covert operations, took on a momentum of their own, and they very quickly went in to realms and into procedures that horrified Kennan. So while it's accurate to say that he first originated the idea that the CIA should have a covert action capability, it's not right to say that he favored using any and all means in that capacity.

CONAN: But talk a little bit more about that fear that many had during the Cold War that by opposing them at every turn, we would in turn become them.

Professor GADDIS: Well, he said this himself, Kennan in his famous 1947 ex-article on sources of Soviet conduct published in Foreign Affairs, said that the worst fate that could befall us could be that in countering the Soviet Union, we would embrace their own tactics and we would wind up being like them, and he even said in another speech in that period that there is a little bit of a totalitarian inside all of us waiting to come out.

What I think is encouraging about the history of the Cold War is that, in fact, that never happened. The United States never came close to being like the Soviet Union and that little bit of totalitarian that is within all of us never came out on our side to the extent that Kennon(ph) worried that it might.

CONAN: Let's talk now with Frank, Frank calling us from New York City.

FRANK (Caller): Hello, I was wondering concerning the Cold War, that the Allies, perhaps they should have adopted a Japan-first strategy to allow the Nazis and Soviets to fight against each other to further weaken both sides, or perhaps should the Allies have invaded through the Balkans as Churchill had suggested. I was wondering what your opinion in that regard would be, in the sense.

Professor GADDIS: Well, my opinion, my opinion is that it might have worked, but I think it was too risky to try because, first of all, if you say the Soviets and the Germans fight each other, you have no guarantee as to who's going to win, and I think it was better that the Germans be defeated under that circumstance, they were an even more brutal regime than the Soviets were at that point. Secondly, it seems to me that the invasion of the Balkans risked bogging down in the Balkans and had that happened, it might have been possible for the Red Army to sweep unopposed all the way to the English Channel, so I'm not too unhappy with the military strategy that, in fact, was embraced in World War II.

FRANK: Because it was also a bad case where the Russians had thoroughly penetrated the U.S. government, especially through the figure of, I guess, through Alger Hess so that they, so that the Soviets had a advantage in terms of they, they knew how hard to, or they knew to take, I guess, to take up.

CONAN: They knew the negotiating positions.

Professor GADDIS: Well, I wouldn't even put it quite that far. They had thoroughly penetrated the top ranks of the British intelligence establishment and what that meant is that they knew some important secrets. I say in the book that they probably had a more accurate sense of the number of atomic weapons that the United States had in 1947 than the American Joint Chiefs of Staff did. On the other hand, they did not have detailed knowledge of American planning, they missed a lot, simply because of their ideological preconceptions.

They did not see the Marshall Plan coming and there was nothing secret about the Marshall Plan. But because of their own ideological preoccupations, their own ideological conviction that capitalists are so greedy that they can never cooperate with one another, they simply failed to foresee that the Marshall Plan could be developed or was being developed, so there were failures of intelligence definitely on both sides.

CONAN: Frank, thanks very much for the call.

CONAN: And we're talking today with John Lewis Gaddis, the author of The Cold War: A New History. Você está ouvindo TALK OF THE NATION do NPR News.

I wanted to ask you, your book does take advantage of the archival material that's become available since the end of the Cold War, much of it from Moscow, as well. What, in retrospect, surprised you?

Professor GADDIS: Well, I would say my book takes advantage of the energies of my students who have used the archival materials that have appeared in Moscow, that's the more accurate way to put it. What has surprised me? I think what has surprised a lot of us who worked in this field is precisely what I was alluding to in the last question, which was that ideology really did matter. When the Marxist-Leninists used the jargon of Marxist-Leninism, when they talked about a proletarian society, when they talked about the internal conflicts of capitalism, they really did believe this. They talked in much the same way to themselves as they did to us in public at the time.

We had always had the idea that the public language and their own private language were two different things and that they had a more realistic sense of the world. That has pretty much been knocked out of the water now by the still-limited access that we have to the Soviet and East European and some Chinese material, as well.

CONAN: One of the things that interested me of the, going back to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, at the time, this was seen in the West as, well, ruthless but a great success by the Soviet Union, and thus the source of the famous Brezhnev Doctrine that socialism would not be turned back, be allowed to be turned back. Yet you say, looking at their materials, they saw it as a failure.

Professor GADDIS: This is pretty clear, they saw it as a failure in a couple of different senses. First of all, they came close to losing control of their own troops in doing this because the troops had been told they would be liberating Czechoslovakia, and the Czechs made it very clear that that was not happening. Secondly, the price they paid, the price the Russians paid in loss of influence, particularly among European intellectuals as a result of having invaded Czechoslovakia, the growth of dissidence against them was a pretty high price.

But even further, it was just at this point that Eastern Europe and ultimately the Soviet Union itself is, it's becoming clear, that these economies can no longer be self-sufficient, that they are dependent on Western investments and technology and even food shipments, and so it became absolutely clear with the Polish Riots of 1970 that the Soviets could never again use military force in Eastern Europe because the result of that would be to make impossible any kind of Western economic assistance to Eastern Europe, and that economic assistance was what was keeping the Soviet system afloat in Eastern Europe. So the whole Brezhnev Doctrine now looks to have been a gigantic Potemkin village.

Professor GADDIS: Yes, it did.

CONAN: And you go back, it's interesting, the threat to use nuclear weapons at various points, going back earlier, for example, Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, you say, was convinced that the Suez intervention in 1956 ended because the Soviet Union threatened the use of nuclear weapons.

Professor GADDIS: Well, he was convinced of this. I think Eisenhower had a rather different view, but Eisenhower's pressure on the British, the French, and the Israelis was financial, and it was behind the scenes. Khrushchev did some public huffing and puffing, which made it look as though he had had an effect on the decision of the British and the French and the Israelis to withdraw, and I do argue in the book that he drew some lessons from this and believed that he could make these claims to have missiles, to be willing to use them, and could extract political advantages from them. Ultimately, this is probably what led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

CONAN: Another story told in The Cold War: A New History, by John Lewis Gaddis. John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovett professor of history at Yale University and joined us today from a studio on the campus there. Professor Gaddis, thanks so much for being with us.

Professor GADDIS: Thanks to you. Enjoyed it.

CONAN: When we come back from a short break, we'll give you a chance to ask Senators Dick Durbin and Sam Brownback about what they asked during the NSA Domestic Surveillance Program earlier this week. I'm Neal Conan, it's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

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The Cold War: A New History

When George Orwell began writing "1984," the totalitarian future he described seemed disturbingly plausible. The Soviet Union, cashing in its chips after World War II, ruled half of Europe and commanded the unswerving loyalty of millions. By the 1950s, two superpowers, bristling with nuclear weapons, stared unblinking across an ideological divide, and the rest of the world trembled.

Forty years later, the Berlin Wall came down and, virtually overnight, the Soviet Union was no more.

The Cold War was over. O que aconteceu? How did the potent wartime alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union turn so quickly into implacable confrontation, and why did the standoff end so abruptly, after a generation of nuclear crises, proxy wars and a seemingly unstoppable arms race?

John Lewis Gaddis, a leading Cold War historian, has addressed such questions at length in works like "The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947," "The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War" and "We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History."

In this new book, he offers a succinct, crisply argued account of the Cold War that draws on his previous work and synthesizes the mountain of archival material that began appearing in the 1990s. Energetically written and lucid, it makes an ideal introduction to the subject.

Gaddis starts with a surprisingly optimistic premise. "The world, I am quite sure, is a better place for that conflict having been fought in the way that it was and won by the side that won it," he writes. The Cold War was much more rational than previously thought, he writes, despite its manifest absurdities, first and foremost the race to develop weapons that, almost by definition, could never be used.

Both sides operated from perfectly reasonable premises, given their experiences in World War II. The Soviet Union, having lost millions of its citizens, saw victory as an opportunity to secure its borders and advance its political agenda around the world. The United States, after showing itself to be a reluctant actor on the world stage, was determined to play a more active role in securing Western Europe's future and, by bolstering democracies and free markets, to protect its own.

The bomb and radically divergent ideologies distorted what otherwise might have been a traditional balance-of-power chess match.

Gaddis, putting forward the first of his Cold War heroes, argues that Dwight D. Eisenhower was much quicker to grasp the implications of a nuclear future than many of the defense-policy intellectuals who tried to square the circle and make nuclear weapons part of a coherent military strategy.

Eisenhower, "at once the most subtle and brutal strategist of the nuclear age," rejected the concept of a limited nuclear war, reasoning, with a general's firsthand understanding of battle, that fear would overrule reason once nuclear weapons came into play.

There would be no middle ground between no war and total war, a stark choice that Winston Churchill saw as a kind of guarantee. "Strange as it may seem, it is to the universality of potential destruction that I think we may look with hope and even confidence," he told the House of Commons. War could no longer be an instrument of policy, something the mercurial Nikita Khrushchev also grasped.

The Cold War once looked like an equal battle between two military giants, with lesser nations of the world reduced to the role of helpless bystanders. Gaddis makes it clear just how helpless U.S. and Soviet leaders often were, their hands tied by manipulative leaders of weaker states who knew exactly how to make the game work to their advantage.

If events in Cuba and Indochina gave Washington fits, Soviet leaders were stymied by North Korea and driven to the point of apoplexy by Mao, who would traumatize Khrushchev by casually commenting that war with the United States might be an excellent idea.

In the end, the impossible became possible. In 1956 and 1968, Russian tanks crushed uprisings in Budapest and Prague. But faced with unrest in Poland in 1981, the Soviets blinked. Intervention, they decided, was out of the question. The superpower was powerless.

A decade later, the Soviet empire no longer existed, and the postwar division of the world came to an end. Just like that. "It could easily have been otherwise," Gaddis writes, in a ringing conclusion, "the world spent the last half of the 20th century having its deepest anxieties not confirmed."


How Did Fidel Castro Downfall

The failed Bay of Pigs Invasion backed by the US government allowed Castro himself to become a dictator and turn his country fully Communistic. In February 1962, the United states enacted a full economic embargo on Cuba that is still in effect to this day. This in turn led to Castro allowing the Soviet Union to install missiles on the island that were well in range of Cuba, starting the Cuban Missile Crisis. This nearly escalated into what would have been World War 3 but thankfully the situation deescalated and the missiles were removed after talks between the United States and the Soviet&hellip


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